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A Broken Theory: The Malfunction Theory of 
Strict Products Liability and the Need for a New 
Doctrine in the Field of Surgical Robotics 
Christopher Beglinger  
  INTRODUCTION   
In early October, Roland Mracek underwent a routine pros-
tate biopsy,1 which revealed that three out of six regions of his 
prostate were positive for adenocarcinoma.2 Following his diag-
nosis, Roland consulted Dr. David McGinnis regarding his treat-
ment options but expressed concerns about the possibility of de-
veloping erectile dysfunction3 as a result of any treatment.4 De-
                                                                                 
  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like 
to thank Professor Richard Painter for helping focus my initial ideas for this 
Note through his guidance and oversight. Thanks also to David Hahn, Torie 
Abbott Watkins, Hillary Hoffman, Sam Cleveland, and the staff and editors of 
the Minnesota Law Review for their contributions, and to my family and friends 
for their support. Copyright © 2019 by Christopher Beglinger. 
 1. Prostate Biopsy, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic 
.org/tests-procedures/prostate-biopsy/about/pac-20384734 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZK3H-YASZ] (defining a prostate biopsy as “a procedure to remove samples of 
suspicious tissue from the prostate”). 
 2. Brief for Appellant at 2, Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 F. App’x 925 
(3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2042). See generally Adenocarcinoma, CANCER TREAT-
MENT CTRS. AM., (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.cancercenter.com/terms/ 
adenocarcinoma/ [https://perma.cc/ZY4Z-HBTR] (defining adenocarcinoma as a 
type of cancer that “forms in mucus-secreting glands throughout the body,” in-
cluding prostate glands). 
 3. Erectile Dysfunction, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www 
.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/erectile-dysfunction/symptoms-causes/syc 
-20355776 [https://perma.cc/MCN3-LC95] (defining erectile dysfunction, or im-
potence, as the “inability to get and keep an erection firm enough for sex”). 
 4. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 2. 
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spite Roland’s concerns, Dr. McGinnis recommended that a rad-
ical prostatectomy5 be performed using the daVinci surgical sys-
tem,6 a robotic technology that translates surgeons’ hand move-
ments into smaller, more precise movements.7 After extensive 
independent research, Roland consented to the surgery believing 
that the robotic system would minimize post-operative risks, es-
pecially compared to traditional laparoscopic surgery.8  
In June, Roland’s prostatectomy was commenced using the 
daVinci system.9 Part way through the surgery10 the robot sud-
denly began displaying error messages.11 The surgical team im-
mediately restarted the system, but Dr. McGinnis was only able 
to operate briefly before the system again displayed error mes-
sages.12 The surgical team called the daVinci manufacturer’s 
support line and local daVinci representatives to assist in trou-
bleshooting the system,13 but despite several attempts to make 
                                                                                 
 5. Radical Prostatectomy, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Nov. 10, 2018), https:// 
www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/radical 
-prostatectomy [https://perma.cc/MK8Z-UNDM] (defining radical prostatec-
tomy as “a surgical procedure for the partial or complete removal of the pros-
tate”). 
 6. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that the physician 
recommended the daVinci system in order to minimize the risk of developing 
post-operative erectile dysfunction).  
 7. See Prostate Surgery, INTUITIVE, (June 19, 2019) https://www 
.davincisurgery.com/procedures/urology-surgery/prostatectomy [https://perma 
.cc/YDQ5-ZKMC] (stating that the daVinci system allows surgeons to perform 
operations through small incisions and includes a magnified vision system that 
gives surgeons a three-dimensional view inside the patient’s body). 
 8. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 3; see Prostate Surgery, supra note 
7 (noting that the daVinci Prostatectomy offers several benefits compared to 
traditional laparoscopy, including patients returning to pre-surgery erectile 
function more quickly, lower risk of complications, and shorter hospital stays). 
See generally Prostatectomy, MAYO CLINIC (2019), https://www.mayoclinic 
.org/tests-procedures/prostatectomy/about/pac-20385198 [https://perma.cc/ 
V94H-YEE6] (describing a laparoscopic prostatectomy as a surgical procedure 
where the surgeon makes several small incisions in the patient’s abdomen and 
inserts special tools to remove the prostate). 
 9. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 3. 
 10. Id. (noting that the surgeon was part way through taking the bladder 
down and dividing the urachus). See generally Urachal Abnormalities, UCSF 
DEP’T UROLOGY (2019), https://urology.ucsf.edu/patient-care/children/urachal 
-abnormalities [https://perma.cc/86YT-AKZ2] (defining the urachus as “the rem-
nant of a channel between the bladder and the . . . belly button”).  
 11. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 4. 
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the robot operational,14 the robot ultimately completely failed to 
function.15 The surgical team was forced to abandon the robotic 
surgery and completed the surgery using traditional laparo-
scopic equipment.16 A week after the surgery was completed, Ro-
land suffered a gross hematuria17 in a public restroom.18 He was 
helped to the hospital by his daughter and was readmitted for 
further hospitalization.19 Roland now suffers from daily ab-
dominal pain, which prevents him from sleeping through the 
night and sitting comfortably for extended periods of time.20 Ad-
ditionally, Roland now also suffers from total erectile dysfunc-
tion,21 turning his pre-operative concerns into his post-operative 
reality. 
Roland sued the daVinci manufacturer, Intuitive Surgical, 
Inc. (Intuitive), under, inter alia, the malfunction theory of strict 
products liability.22 Under the malfunction theory, a plaintiff 
may present circumstantial evidence to raise a supportable in-
ference of a product defect.23 Such an inference is afforded upon 
satisfying the malfunction theory’s three-pronged test, which re-
quires providing evidence of a malfunction, evidence eliminating 
                                                                                 
 14. The surgical team attempted multiple times to reposition the robotic 
arms, undock the robot from its trocars, and undock and restart the system and 
the surgeon attempted to manually position the robot’s camera to use it while 
he performed the remainder of the surgery laparoscopically; however, the sys-
tem remained nonoperational. See id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. (noting that by the time the robotic surgery was abandoned and 
the laparoscopic equipment was brought in and utilized, nearly forty-five 
minutes had elapsed). 
 17. See Blood in Urine (Hematuria), MAYO CLINIC (2019), https://www 
.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/blood-in-urine/symptoms-causes/syc 
-20353432 [https://perma.cc/4ZVP-W49X] (defining a gross hematuria as blood 
that is visible in a person’s urine). 
 18. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 4. 
 19. See id. at 5 (noting that the man’s gross hematuria also required irri-
gation of his bladder). See generally Management of Clot Retention Following 
Urological Surgery, NURSINGTIMES, https://www.nursingtimes.net/archive/ 
management-of-clot-retention-following-urological-surgery-09-07-2002 
[https://perma.cc/MA82-TZH6] (defining bladder irrigation as “a procedure in 
which sterile fluid is used to prevent clot retention by continuously irrigating 
the bladder,” and noting that it is generally necessary when glands and organs 
bleed during postoperative periods). 
 20. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 5. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Mracek, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 403. 
 23. Id. 
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abnormal use, and reasonable secondary causes of the malfunc-
tion.24 The court relied on Intuitive’s assertion that “[t]he use 
and timing of various ancillary medical equipment in connection 
with th[e] innovative and complex procedure reinforces that any 
number of reasonable secondary causes could or were responsi-
ble for the alleged damages,” and stated that Roland failed to 
offer evidence to eliminate reasonable secondary causes of the 
malfunction.25 As a result, the court concluded that Roland failed 
to meet the burden necessary to survive a motion for summary 
judgment and granted summary judgment for Intuitive.26 
This Note explores the boundaries of products liability law 
in the field of robotics, specifically the application of the malfunc-
tion theory of products liability to surgical robots. Looking at the 
technological complexities of robotics in the modern digital age, 
the frequency of human-robot interactions, and the underlying 
policy concerns surrounding products liability law, this Note ar-
gues that a new approach to the malfunction theory should be 
adopted to better address the advent of robotics in modern soci-
ety. Part I explores the history of products liability and the de-
velopment of strict products liability, discusses the advent of the 
malfunction theory of products liability in response to technolog-
ical advances, and highlights the significant advances in the 
field of robotics over the past several decades. Part II explores 
the current legal landscape surrounding the malfunction theory 
and frames its application to the medical device field. Part III 
revisits the three-pronged malfunction theory test, and purports 
that although the court in Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hospital27 ap-
plied a legal standard that aligns with existing malfunction the-
ory jurisprudence, a new standard is needed in the field of sur-
gical robotics. Ultimately, this Note proposes that, in applying 
the malfunction theory of products liability to surgical robotics, 
state courts should infer a product defect from the occurrence of 
a malfunction in the absence of abnormal use, and raise a rebut-
table presumption that there were no reasonable secondary 
causes of the malfunction.  
                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2042). 
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I.  TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MALFUNCTION THEORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND 
ITS RELEVANCE IN THE MODERN DIGITAL AGE   
Products liability law has developed over several centu-
ries.28 Initially, courts and legislators spurned claims against 
manufacturers out of an underlying desire to encourage eco-
nomic growth.29 However, with the coming of age of the U.S. in-
dustrial system, courts began to take notice of consumers’ na-
iveté concerning the safety of the products they purchased.30 As 
a result, over the past century courts and legislators have devel-
oped a body of law surrounding products liability that centers 
around balancing consumer safety and economic growth. This 
Part begins with Section A, which explores the history of prod-
ucts liability and the development of the strict products liability 
doctrine. Then, Section B discusses the emergence of demon-
strating product defects through circumstantial evidence and 
the advent of the malfunction theory in response to technological 
advances. Finally, Section C outlines the history of robotics, its 
evolution into modern society, and the extent to which robotics 
are used in surgical applications. 
A. THE HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
DOCTRINE 
The foundational principles surrounding products liability 
law consist of a mixture of contract law and tort law, which have 
developed over several centuries.31 Because products liability is 
hybrid in nature, it is important to appreciate how technological 
advances over the past century have influenced this area of law, 
                                                                                 
 28. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, FINDLAW (2019), 
https://injury.findlaw.com/product-liability/product-liability-background.html 
[https://perma.cc/BT2T-S4KC]. 
 29. Solly Robins, Products Liability Cases, 12 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, 6 (2019) 
(noting that historically, “claims against manufacturers were denied on the ba-
sis of a wide range of theories, including caveat emptor, lack of privity, contrib-
utory negligence,” and other defenses that “fitted the peculiar facts and circum-
stances”). 
 30. See infra Parts I.A.2–3. 
 31. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28 (noting 
that aspects of product liability law relating to tort law include strict liability, 
negligence, and deceit, and aspects relating to contract law include privity of 
contract and implied warranties). 
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and how the growth of robotics in today’s digital age has inevita-
bly impacted the current legal landscape. 
1. Caveat Emptor, Implied Warranties, and the General Rule 
of Privity 
The origins of products liability law trace back to English 
courts in the early 1600s.32 Rooted in contract law, English 
courts established the doctrine of caveat emptor, Latin for “let 
the buyer beware.”33 Under this doctrine, a vendor had no duty 
to communicate latent defects “in his wares,” unless the vendor 
represented that no defect existed.34 As a result, English courts 
consistently held that buyers were expected to protect them-
selves from both obvious and hidden defects in the products they 
purchased,35 which led to centuries of decisions that strongly fa-
vored product manufacturers.36  
Over time, English courts exhibited a modest shift toward 
consumer safety and gradually reduced the burden placed on 
consumers by recognizing what are now known as implied war-
ranties.37 In products liability cases, English courts recognized 
                                                                                 
 32. See generally DENIS W. STEARNS, PRODUCT LIABILITY: A BRIEF HIS-
TORY OF ITS EARLY ORIGINS (2005), https://marlerclark.com/pdfs/product 
-liability-history.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS5F-7GCL] (noting that products lia-
bility law traces back to ancient Rome and that the modern framework evolved 
from contract law). 
 33. See Caveat emptor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (noting 
that under the doctrine, a purchaser buys at his or her own risk). 
 34. WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 245 (Arthur 
L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. Ed. 1919). 
 35. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28; see Ca-
veat Emptor, WEXOLOGY/CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
caveat_emptor [https://perma.cc/6QVY-DEX4] (noting caveat emptor places the 
burden on buyers to “examine property” before purchasing, and to “take respon-
sibility for its condition”). 
 36. Stearns, supra note 32; see Chandelor v. Lopus [1603] 79 Eng. Rep. 3 
(holding that a goldsmith, with special knowledge of stones, was not liable for 
selling a “bezoar” stone that in fact possessed no healing powers because the 
quality of the stone was a risk the buyer assumed). 
 37. See Implied Warranty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defin-
ing implied warranty as “[a]n obligation imposed by law when there has been 
no representation or promise,” which arises “because of the circumstances of a 
sale, rather than by the seller’s express promise”); see also Crosse v. Gardner 
[1688] 90 Eng. Rep. 656 (holding that although the defendant was not the true 
owner of an oxen, and the plaintiff had failed to allege a warranty, a warranty 
of title could be inferred from the defendant’s affirmation that he was entitled 
to sell the chattel). 
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implied warranties of merchantability38 and held that sellers 
were presumed to implicitly warrant that the products they sold 
did not contain any hidden defects.39 Despite this shift in English 
courts, U.S. courts continued to employ the doctrine of caveat 
emptor for most of the nineteenth century.40  
By the late 1800s, U.S. courts had gradually begun to recog-
nize implied warranties in products liability cases,41 but com-
pared to English courts, this shift was considerably limited.42 
Most notably, courts in the United States required end users43 
to have privity of contract44 with the seller in order to bring 
suit.45 Rooted in the English case Winterbottom v. Wright,46 the 
                                                                                 
 38. Implied Warranty of Merchantability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019) (defining an implied warranty of merchantability as a “merchant 
seller’s warranty—implied by law—that the thing sold is fit for its ordinary pur-
poses”). 
 39. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28; see Gar-
diner v. Gray (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (stating a purchaser had a right to inspect 
silk “answering the description in the contract” because even without a war-
ranty “there is an implied term in every such contract,” and that when “there is 
no opportunity to inspect the commodity . . . caveat emptor does not apply”). 
 40. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28; see 
Seixas v. Wood, 2 Cai. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (holding that a merchant that 
inadvertently sold peachum wood, which was advertised as braziletto wood, was 
not liable because the purchaser had a duty to inspect the goods); see also 
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 194 (1817) (holding a tobacco pur-
chaser was not required to communicate information regarding a peace treaty 
that would increase the price of tobacco because “[i]t would be difficult to cir-
cumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits”). 
 41. See Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N.Y. 198, 202 (1872) (holding a merchant 
that resold bottles labeled “blue vitriol,” which were in fact of inferior quality, 
liable despite the lack of an express warranty because if “the representation as 
to the character and quality of the article sold be positive . . . and the vendee 
understand[s] it as a warranty . . . the vendor is bound”). 
 42. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28. 
 43. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 44. Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining privity as 
“the relationship between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest 
in the same subject matter”). 
 45. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28; see also 
infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 46. See Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (holding that 
since a mail delivery driver lacked privity of contract with a coach manufac-
turer, the driver could not sue based on a contract made between the manufac-
turer and Postmaster-General). The court reasoned that “there [was] no privity 
of contract between [the] parties; and if the [delivery driver could] sue, every 
passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was in-
jured . . . might bring a similar action.” Id. at 405. 
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privity requirement mandated that consumers and sellers have 
a legally cognizable interest in the same transaction.47 As a re-
sult, U.S. courts consistently required that consumers purchased 
a product directly from a vender to recover for a product’s de-
fect.48 Accordingly, as industries developed and manufacturers 
relied more heavily on intermediary retailers, U.S. courtrooms 
remained closed and consumers were unable to recover due to 
lack of privity.49 
2. Opening the Courtroom Through Exceptions and 
MacPherson 
In the decades that followed Winterbottom, U.S. courts 
slowly began to recognize exceptions to the general rule of priv-
ity.50 Initially, courts granted exceptions in cases involving prod-
ucts that were imminently or inherently dangerous.51 Then, 
courts recognized exceptions in cases where sellers knew that a 
                                                                                 
 47. Privity, supra note 44. 
 48. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28; see Sav. 
Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (holding that an attorney who reported on a 
land title was not liable to a third party that relied on such report because the 
parties lacked privity of contract); see also Houseman v. Girard Mut. Bldg. & 
Loan Ass’n, 81 Pa. 256 (1876) (holding the recorder of deeds is liable only to the 
party that asks and pays for certificates, not subsequent alienees). 
 49. Product Liability Law: Some Legal Background, supra note 28; see Gal-
braith v. Ill. Steel Co., 133 F. 485, 486 (7th Cir. 1904) (holding that a building 
owner that contracted with a sprinkler company could not recover from a sub-
contracted engineering company for damages arising out of the collapse of a 
water tank because, inter alia, the owner and engineering company lacked priv-
ity of contract).  
 50. Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories, 98 MARQ. 
L. REV. 555, 564 (2014). 
 51. See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 866 (8th Cir. 
1903) (holding that the manufacturer of a grain threshing rig, which contained 
a pliable sheet over a self-feeding band cutter, liable to a user that lost his leg 
after stepping on the pliable sheet). The court reasoned that the manufacturer 
of a machine known “to be imminently dangerous . . . to any one [sic] who shall 
use it for the purpose for which it was made and intended, [is] liable.” Id. at 866; 
see also Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 397 (1852) (holding a drug and med-
icine manufacturer liable for allowing a deadly poison, which was erroneously 
labeled as a harmless medicine, to reach the market). Thomas indicated that 
deadly poisons are inherently dangerous, and noted that the rule in Winterbot-
tom is inappropriate where the inherently dangerous nature of the product in-
volved makes “death or great bodily harm of some person . . . the natural and 
almost inevitable consequence of the sale.” Thomas, 6 N.Y. at 409. 
  
2019] A BROKEN THEORY 1049 
 
product was inherently dangerous, but failed to disclose the dan-
ger to the unknowing buyer.52 Ultimately, these exceptional 
cases set the stage for the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co.,53 which drastically changed the scope of products liability 
law. 
MacPherson involved an automobile that suddenly “col-
lapsed”54 and injured the automobile owner.55 The owner at-
tributed the accident to a defective wheel supplied by a compo-
nents manufacturer, which was integrated into the finished ve-
hicle by Buick.56 Since the automobile was purchased from an 
intermediary, Buick disclaimed liability due to lack of privity of 
contract with the owner.57 In a divergence from its jurispruden-
tial framework, the court held that the lack of privity did not 
protect Buick from liability.58 The court drew on the “inherent 
danger” exception, and expanded it so as to essentially swallow 
the general rule of privity.59 The court stated that the inherent 
danger exception “is not limited to poisons, explosives, and 
things of like nature . . . . [If] the thing is such that it is reason-
ably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently 
made, it is then a thing of danger.”60 Ultimately, this watershed 
decision effectively swept the doctrine of privity aside,61 and 
                                                                                 
 52. See Lewis v. Terry, 43 P. 398 (Cal. 1896) (holding a vendor with 
knowledge of defects in a folding bed liable to a purchaser that suffered injuries 
resulting from the bed collapsing); see also Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 
75 N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1905) (holding the manufacturer of a road roller that con-
cealed defects in the tongue attachment liable to a purchaser that was run over 
by the roller after the tongue attachment broke away from his team of horses). 
 53. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 54. Id. at 1052 (noting that one of the wheels was made of defective wood, 
and its spokes crumbled causing the owner to be thrown from the vehicle). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1051. 
 57. Id.  
 58. See id. at 1054 (noting that “there is nothing anomalous in a rule which 
imposes upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others ac-
cording as he knows or does not know that the subject-matter of the contract is 
intended for their use”). 
 59. See id. at 1053 (stating that “[b]eyond all question, the nature of an 
automobile gives warning of probable danger if its construction is defec-
tive . . . unless wheels are sound and strong, injury was almost certain. It was 
as much a thing of danger as a defective engine for a railroad”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946) (stating 
that the doctrine of the MacPherson case was then generally accepted); see also 
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opened the courtroom to anyone that was foreseeably expected 
to suffer an injury as a result of a defective product. 
3. Modern Products Liability and the Development of Strict 
Products Liability in Tort 
Throughout the 1900s, the rise of mass production, the in-
troduction of wholesale intermediaries into supply chains, and 
the expansion of product advertising placed a physical distance 
between the makers and users of many products.62 Recognizing 
this, courts gradually adopted more plaintiff-friendly attitudes 
toward products liability cases;63 though, much of courts’ doctri-
nal analysis remained rooted in contract law and theories of im-
plied warranties.64 
After MacPherson, the legal community largely believed 
that negligence law could not adequately address all of the prob-
lems posed by defective products in the evolving industrial age.65 
Most notably, William Prosser, a leading twentieth century tort 
law scholar, believed that there was “an increased feeling that 
social policy demands that . . . [a] consumer [be] entitled to max-
imum protection at the hands of some one . . . and that the pro-
ducer, practically and morally, [was] the one to provide it.”66 As 
a result, Prosser proposed the idea of imposing strict liability in 
tort law on manufacturers.67 Judges first supported Prosser’s 
idea of imposing strict products liability in tort law in 1944;68 
                                                                                 
id. (supporting such assertion by citing to the American Law Institute’s RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 394–402 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); and several 
other treatises on tort law, including FOWLER HARPER, TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF TORT (1933); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT (1941); 
P.H. WINFIELD, A TEXT-BOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1937)). 
 62. See Graham, supra note 50, at 565 (describing the shifts in the market 
for consumer goods over the course of the late 1800s and early 1900s). 
 63. See id. at 567 (noting an upswell of products liability cases in the 
1960s).  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 568. 
 66. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 689; see also Graham, supra note 50, at 569 
(stating that there is “an increased feeling that social policy demands that the 
burden of accidental injuries caused by defective chattels be placed upon the 
producer”). 
 67. PROSSER, supra note 61, at 689. 
 68. Graham, supra note 50, at 568; see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 
P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (stating it should be “recog-
nized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when the article that he 
has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, 
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however, it was not until 1963 that courts’ views on products li-
ability reform shifted from warranty protections to “pure” tort 
law.69 Then in 1964, Prosser tendered to the American Law In-
stitute (ALI)70 a provision that allowed the ultimate user or con-
sumer to proceed in tort, on a strict liability basis, against the 
seller of any product in a defective condition.71 The ALI approved 
of Prosser’s work, and in 1965 published § 402A of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.72 In the years that followed, courts and legis-
lators rushed to adopt a tort-based theory of products liability,73 
and by 1976 forty-two states had adopted strict liability in tort.74  
Since the mid-1970s, § 402A of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts has defined American products liability law.75 Under 
                                                                                 
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings”). 
 69. Graham, supra note 50, at 576. See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (supporting the idea that a manufac-
turer can be strictly liable in tort). The court stated that “[a] manufacturer is 
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it 
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to a human being.” Id. at 900. The court reasoned that tort, rather than 
warranty, was the optimal doctrinal solution to the problems presented by de-
fective products. Id. at 901. 
 70. See About ALI, AM. LAW INST. (2019), https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ 
[https://perma.cc/D86L-H296] (noting that the American Law Institute is the 
leading independent organization in the United States that produces scholarly 
work to clarify, modernize, and improve the law, including Restatements of the 
Law, Model Codes, and Principles of Law). 
 71. Graham, supra note 50, at 577. 
 72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the 
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected 
to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the con-
dition in which it is sold. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) 
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the seller.”). 
 73. See Graham, supra note 50, at 578 n.161 (outlining the jurisdictions 
that adopted strict liability in tort through either judicial decision or legislative 
acts). 
 74. See generally id. at 579 (noting that today only Delaware, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia have not adopted strict liability 
in tort, and continue to couch their consumer protection laws in warranty doc-
trines). 
 75. Michael J. Tõke, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defectiveness 
in American Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 239 
(1996). 
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§ 402A, a manufacturer that “sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer” is 
liable for the physical harm caused if “the seller is engaged in 
the business of selling such a product” and the product is “ex-
pected to and does reach the user or consumer.”76 The comments 
to § 402A clarify that “user” is meant to include those that are 
“passively enjoying the benefit of the product.”77 Courts have 
also construed the term “consumer or user” broadly to provide 
protection to purchasers as well as non-purchasing users or con-
sumers.78 Moreover, in furtherance of predominant equitable 
considerations,79 courts have historically held that third-party 
bystanders that are foreseeably expected to “come within the 
range of danger” of a defective product are entitled to greater 
protection under § 402A.80 Although the comments to and courts’ 
interpretations of § 402A suggest a theoretically broad class of 
plaintiffs, additional comments to § 402A have drastically cir-
cumscribed the utility of the modern strict products liability doc-
trine. Most notably, comments advise that § 402A should only 
apply “where the product is, at the time it leaves the sellers 
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous,” and that “[t]he 
burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at 
the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the 
                                                                                 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. 
 77. See id. § 402A cmt.l (illustrating that “those who are passively enjoying 
the benefit of the product” includes passengers in automobiles or airplanes). 
 78. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 18:136 (2019). 
 79. Id. (noting previous sources that held that bystanders are entitled to 
greater protection than consumers or users because the consumers and users 
have at least the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases 
to articles that are manufactured by reputable manufactures and sold by repu-
table dealers, whereas a bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities); see 
also Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (stating that “if 
any distinction should be made between bystanders and users, it should be 
made . . . to extend greater liability in favor of the bystanders”); Darryl v. Ford 
Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969) (stating that “[t]here is no adequate 
rationale or theoretical explanation why non-users and non-consumers should 
be denied recovery against the manufacturer of a defective product,” and that 
“[t]he reason for extending the strict liability doctrine to innocent bystanders is 
the desire to minimize risks of personal injury and/or property damage”). 
 80. SPEISER, supra note 78. See generally Horst v. Deere & Co., 769 N.W.2d 
536 (Wis. 2009) (allowing an infant’s guardian ad litem to bring a strict products 
liability action against the manufacturer of a riding lawn mower after the in-
fant’s feet were cut off by the lawn mower being operated in reverse by the in-
fant’s father).  
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injured plaintiff.”81 As a result, over the past fifty years the 
plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating that a “product was in a de-
fective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular 
seller”82 has significantly limited the utility of strict products li-
ability, specifically in cases involving remote or third-party by-
stander plaintiffs, and cases containing evidentiary questions 
surrounding whether a product defect was attributable to the 
manufacturer, improper maintenance by the user, a party’s neg-
ligence, and/or simply the result of an accident. 
B. THE USE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN STRICT 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES AND THE ADVENT OF THE 
MALFUNCTION THEORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
Courts have consistently held that in order for users to pre-
vail on a strict products liability claim the user must prove “that 
a product was defective, that the product contained the defect 
when it left the defendant’s control, and that the defect proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff harm.”83 Sometimes, consumers can 
offer direct evidence that identifies a specific product defect;84 
however, other times users are unable to point to a specific de-
fect, either because the product no longer exists, the defect can-
not be precisely identified,85 or the injured plaintiff is far too re-
moved from the product so as to opine to the specific defect.86 As 
a result, courts have developed alternative ways for consumers 
and remote users to bring products liability claims, despite lack-
ing direct evidence of a defect.87 
                                                                                 
 81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt.g. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Ashley Menage, When Products Self-Destruct: Making the Case for the 
Product-Less Plaintiff Using Res Ipsa Loquitur, the Malfunction Doctrine, and 
§ 3, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 349, 357 (2014) (quoting Fallon v. Matworks, 918 A.2d 
1067, 1075 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)). 
 84. See id. at 357 (stating that consumers can identify a specific defect ei-
ther by providing the product itself for examination or through expert testi-
mony). 
 85. Bruce H. Raymond & Lanell H. Allen, Malfunction Theory as a Triple 
Threat for the Defense, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 297, 298 (2013). 
 86. Cf. Wentworth v. Kawasaki, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1114 (D.N.H. 1981) 
(holding that although the driver did not own nor know about the safety and 
maintenance of his friend’s snowmobile, the injured driver could proceed on a 
strict products liability claim). 
 87. See, e.g., Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 
1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment for defendant despite the plaintiff 
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1. Proving Product Defects Through Circumstantial Evidence 
Over the past century, U.S. courts have allowed plaintiffs to 
use circumstantial evidence surrounding an injury to support 
their products liability claims.88 This approach stems from the 
negligence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Latin for “the thing 
speaks for itself,”89 under which a plaintiff is afforded a strong 
inference of a manufacturer’s negligence without the need to 
identify any particular misconduct.90 Today, res ipsa loquitur is 
recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D91 and has 
been adopted in one form or another in a majority of states; how-
ever, many states expressly reject its application to strict prod-
ucts liability cases.92 
                                                                                 
being unable to prove a specific defect that caused a jar of peanut butter to shat-
ter when replacing the cap); Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 298. See gen-
erally Liberty Mut. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 A.2d 1254 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1979) (permitting the jury to rely on circumstantial evidence surrounding a 
fire that was caused by a television that erupted into flames during normal use). 
 88. Menage, supra note 83, at 362. 
 89. Res Ipsa Loquitur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 90. Menage, supra note 83, at 352; see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
150 P.2d 436, 439 (Cal. 1944) (allowing res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference 
that Coca Cola’s negligence was responsible for a bottle exploding in the wait-
ress’s hand). See generally Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (holding a 
building owner liable for a barrel that fell from a window and injured a pedes-
trian, despite no evidence of the building owner’s negligence). The court stated, 
“[t]here are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur . . . . A barrel 
could not roll out of a warehouse without some negligence, and to say that a 
plaintiff who is injured by it must call witnesses from the warehouse to prove 
negligence seems . . . preposterous.” Id. at 300–01. 
 91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“It 
may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence of 
the defendant when (a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of 
the plaintiff and third persons are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and 
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the 
plaintiff.”). 
 92. Menage, supra note 83, at 366–67. Although the justifications for re-
jecting res ipsa vary, the common theme appears to be that courts are unwilling 
to apply a negligence doctrine to a concept that, by definition, does not require 
a plaintiff to prove negligence. Id. See also generally Barrett v. Atlas Powder 
Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is not applicable in any action predicated upon the theory of strict lia-
bility); Eisenmenger v. Ethicon, Inc., 871 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1994) (stating 
that the theory of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in products liability cases 
under a strict liability theory).   
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The ALI appeared to recognize the issues surrounding the 
application of res ipsa loquitur to strict products liability cases, 
stating that although indeterminate product defect cases repre-
sent “a small number of cases, they are an important number of 
cases, and as a matter of fairness they must be able to be pre-
served because of the inherent destructibility of some prod-
ucts.”93 As a result, the ALI published § 3: Circumstantial Evi-
dence Supporting Inference of Product Defect in Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability.94 
Despite the apparent similarities between § 328D of Re-
statement (Second) of Torts and § 3 of Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, the distinctions between the two have had significant im-
pact on the use of circumstantial evidence in complex products 
liability cases. For example, although § 3 defines the “incident 
that harmed the plaintiff” more broadly than § 328D, including 
all incidents that “ordinarily occur as a result of [a] product de-
fect,”95 § 3 imposes a more demanding standard on the elimina-
tion of alternative causes, requiring proof that the incident was 
not “solely the result of causes other than [a] product defect ex-
isting at the time of sale.”96 And although § 3’s commentary sug-
gests that courts should apply their traditional frameworks in 
evaluating the elimination of reasonable secondary causes,97 
                                                                                 
 93. Thursday Morning Session – May 18, 1995, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 239, 240 
(1995).  
 94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3) (“It may be in-
ferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product defect 
existing at the time or sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, 
when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: (a) was of a kind that ordinarily 
occurs as a result of product defect; and (b) was not, in the particular case, solely 
the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or 
distribution.”). 
 95. Compare id. (defining “incident that harmed the plaintiff ” to include 
incidents that “ordinarily occur as a result of [a] product defect”), with RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (requiring that the inci-
dent be of the kind that “would not have occurred in the absence of a [product] 
defect”). 
 96. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (requiring 
that the incident was not “solely the result of causes other than product defect 
existing at the time of sale or distribution”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 328D (requiring only that other reasonable causes “are sufficiently 
eliminated by the evidence”). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3, reporters’ note to 
cmt.d. But see infra Part II.A (describing the modern trend toward a more nu-
anced approach to the malfunction theory of products liability). 
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some courts have interpreted § 3’s commentary more strictly, re-
quiring evidence that eliminates improper maintenance or re-
pair, or negligence by the user or third-parties, as a potential 
cause of the product defect.98 As a result, the utility of circum-
stantial evidence has proven to be vastly different, depending on 
the jurisdiction, industry, and factual scenario of each case.99 
2. The Advent of the Malfunction Theory of Products Liability 
Despite courts’ historic rejection of res ipsa loquitur to prod-
ucts liability cases, over the past fifty years a vast body of case 
law has developed that affords consumers an inference of a prod-
uct defect through circumstantial evidence. One theory that 
courts have accepted is the malfunction theory of products liabil-
ity.100 Under the malfunction theory, a plaintiff may establish a 
prima facie case by providing evidence of the nature of a prod-
uct’s malfunction, under circumstances that give rise to an infer-
ence that the malfunction would not have occurred absent a de-
fect existing at the time of sale.101 Courts have articulated the 
malfunction theory’s three-pronged test as permitting a plaintiff 
to prove a product defect with “evidence of the occurrence of a 
malfunction and with evidence eliminating abnormal use [and] 
reasonable, secondary causes for the malfunction.”102 As a result, 
a plaintiff is relieved of “demonstrating precisely the defect yet 
it permits the trier-of-fact to infer one existed from the evidence 
                                                                                 
 98. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Tex. 2004) (stating 
that “a product defect cannot be inferred without proof of a specific defect be-
cause of a product’s age or the presence of modifications or repairs”). 
 99. See infra Part II.A. 
 100. See Phillip Earl Wilson Jr., Doctrinal Malfunction: Spoliation and 
Products Liability Law in Pennsylvania, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 899, 904 (1996) (not-
ing that the malfunction theory has its origins in Pennsylvania case law and 
encompasses nothing more than circumstantial evidence of product malfunc-
tion); see also Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751, 753–54 
(Pa. 1989) (accepting the malfunction theory of products liability). See generally 
Gordner v. Dynetics Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1303, 1305 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Rog-
ers and permitting a worker to use circumstantial evidence to maintain an ac-
tion against an industrial machine manufacturer under the malfunction the-
ory); Schlier v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 835 F. Supp. 839, 841 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (citing Rogers and permitting a plaintiff to maintain an action under the 
malfunction theory of strict products liability, so long as the plaintiff shows a 
malfunction free of secondary causes).  
 101. Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 298. 
 102. Rogers, 565 A.2d at 754; Schlier, 835 F. Supp. at 841 (quoting Rogers); 
Gordner, 862 F. Supp. at 1305 (quoting Rogers). 
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of the malfunction, of the absence of abnormal use and of the 
absence of reasonable, secondary causes.”103  
It is important to recognize that although the prevailing ar-
ticulation of the malfunction theory, in large part, tracks the lan-
guage of § 3 of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 
much of the doctrine’s developments occurred prior to § 3’s pub-
lication.104 Accordingly, a substantial portion of the malfunction 
theory’s framework was influenced by Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, and the res ipsa loquitur approach of § 328D.105 And in 
response to enormous technological advances over the past sev-
eral decades, courts have attempted to balance changes in doc-
trinal frameworks, the applicability of existing products liability 
concepts, and underlying policy concerns. Advances in robotic 
technologies continue to be implemented into practice, and the 
following Section foreshadows that the legal field will inescapa-
bly be challenged to balance the efficacy of existing products lia-
bility doctrines in complex robotics cases involving remote plain-
tiffs, with the underlying social concerns arising from the dan-
gers posed by robotics in today’s digital age.106 
C. THE ADVENT OF ROBOTICS IN THE MODERN DIGITAL AGE  
The Industrial Revolution presented a conundrum: ma-
chines provided sprawling social and industrial benefits, but 
radically changed the United States’ socioeconomic makeup and 
drastically altered the way people lived and worked.107 Analo-
gously, the development of the microprocessor108 has thrust so-
ciety into a “second Industrial Revolution,” presenting a similar 
                                                                                 
 103. Rogers, 565 A.2d at 754.  
 104. For examples of the limited cases that cite the malfunction theory of 
strict products liability prior to § 3’s publication in 1996, see Wasson v. HRI 
Liquidating Corp., No. CIV. A. 92-3053, 1995 WL 130652 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 
1995); Gordner, 862 F. Supp. at 1303; Schwartz v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 851 F. 
Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Schlier, 835 F. Supp. at 839; Rogers, 565 A.2d at 754. 
 105. See, e.g., Rogers, 565 A.2d at 755 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the majority’s approach to the malfunction theory “could be said to be a res ipsa 
loquitur approach”). 
 106. See infra Part II.A. 
 107. See Debra J. Zidich, Robotics in the Workplace: The Employer’s Duty To 
Bargain over Its Implementation and Effect on the Worker, 24 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 917, 919 (1984) (stating the industrial revolution marked humans’ first 
love/hate relationship with machines). 
 108. See generally Microprocessor, TECHOPEDIA, (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www 
.techopedia.com/definition/2874/microprocessor [perma.cc/26QT-P2V2] (de-
scribing a microprocessor as the central unit of a computer that executes logical 
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conundrum: computers have positively impacted societal stand-
ards but pose significant risks to consumer safety and secu-
rity.109 As the following discussion reveals, the technological de-
velopments of the “second Industrial Revolution” have on the one 
hand significantly transformed today’s society, but on the other 
give rise to a multitude of complex legal issues in products lia-
bility law. 
1. The History of Robotics and Its Evolution in Modern Society 
Although the concept of robotics can be traced back to Greek 
philosophers,110 robots initially entered the popular conscious-
ness in the early 1900s through literary works.111 However, tech-
nological inadequacies of the twentieth century prevented robots 
from being anything more than science fiction until the mid-
1900s.112 It was not until 1954 that George Devol designed “Un-
imate,” the first truly programmable robotic arm.113 Then in 
1961 General Motors introduced Unimate into its assembly 
lines;114 this paved the way for robots to complete repetitive, dif-
ficult, or dangerous tasks in industrial applications.115 
                                                                                 
instructions and performs tasks in processing). 
 109. Zidich, supra note 107, at 917. 
 110. Scott Carey & Laurie Clarke, A Brief History of Robotics – A Timeline 
of Key Achievements in the Fields of Robotics and AI, from Azimov to AlphaGo, 
TECHWORLD (May 1, 2018), https://www.techworld.com/picture-gallery/apps 
-wearables/brief-history-of-robotics-timeline-of-key-achievements-in-field-since 
-1941-3645131/ [https://perma.cc/92KA-Z6NF]. 
 111. See Neil G. Hockstein et al., A History of Robots: From Science Fiction 
to Surgical Robots, 1 J. ROBOTIC SURGERY 113, 113 (2007) (noting that in 1920, 
Karl Capek first introduced society to the word “robot” in his play Rossum’s 
Universal Robots); see also Carey & Clarke, supra note 110 (noting that in 1943, 
American author Isaac Asimov established today’s conception of robots as hu-
manoids through his Three Laws of Robotics). 
 112. See Carey & Clarke, supra note 110 (noting that in 1948 William Grey 
Walter developed what are considered to be the first electronically autonomous 
robots); see also History of Robotics: Timeline, ROBOTSHOP DISTRIBUTION, INC. 
(2008), https://www.robotshop.com/media/files/PDF/timeline.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/GN52-T3RC] (noting that Walter’s “turtle robots” were the first robots capa-
ble of locating and returning to a charging station when their battery power ran 
low). 
 113. Carey & Clarke, supra note 110. 
 114. See id. (noting that in 1960, Devol sold Unimate to General Motors); 
Hockstein, supra note 111, at 114 (noting that General Motors introduced Uni-
mate into assembly lines in 1961). 
 115. Carey & Clarke, supra note 110. 
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In the decades that followed the use of robots in industrial 
applications grew exponentially.116 Today, the colloquial term 
“robot” can be used to describe an expansive array of devices,117 
including automated arms, mobile devices, mills, and telerobotic 
devices.118 Moreover, modern robots can be further characterized 
as “active” or “semiactive” devices, which can carry out tasks in-
dependent of, or dependent on, operator oversight, respec-
tively.119 Today, active and semiactive robots are used through-
out the world in nearly all industries as a way to duplicate re-
petitive tasks, improve upon human functions, or offer services 
in situations that are too hazardous for direct human work.120 
2. Robotic Technology’s Use in the Medical Industry 
Compared to other industries, the healthcare industry has 
been relatively slow to implement robotic technologies.121 Ini-
tially, active devices were theorized to have utility in clinical ap-
plications;122 however, it was not until the mid-1980s that robots 
were first utilized in surgical procedures.123 Additionally, it was 
                                                                                 
 116. See id. (noting that in 1966 Stanford Research Institute developed 
“Shakey” the robot, which represented the first robotic blending of hardware 
and software so as to enable a robot to perceive its surroundings); see also id. 
(noting that in 2000 Honda released its Advanced Step in Innovative Mobility, 
a humanoid robot designed to be a personal assistant that understands voice 
commands, gestures, and can engage with its surroundings). 
 117. Hockstein, supra note 111, at 114 (noting that a variety of classifica-
tions or categories of devices can be used to describe the heterogeneous nature 
of robots). 
 118. Id.  
 119. See id. (describing active devices as programmable devices that carry 
out tasks independent of an operator’s oversight, and semiactive devices as de-
vices that typically translate movements from an operator’s hands into powered 
or unpowered movements of the robot end-effector arms). 
 120. Id. (noting that robots have been used in deep sea and space explora-
tion, military use, and rescue missions). 
 121. Compare Carey & Clarke, supra note 110 (indicating that robots were 
first introduced into the manufacturing industry in the early 1960s), with Hock-
stein, supra note 111, at 114 (noting that it was not until the mid-1980s that 
robots were first implemented in the healthcare industry). 
 122. Hockstein, supra note 111, at 114 (noting pre-programmed data and 
computer algorithms could be used in surgical applications without real time 
operator input). 
 123. See id. (noting that in 1985, the first robotic surgery was performed, 
which utilized a modified robotic arm to perform a stereotactic brain biopsy). 
See generally Stereotactic Brain Biopsy, AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS 
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.aans.org/Patients/Neurosurgical-Conditions-and 
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not until the 1980s, following developments by the National Aer-
onautics and Space Administration (NASA),124 that academics 
and surgeons theorized the concept of telepresence125 surgery, 
where surgeons could be virtually inserted into an operating 
field and complete surgical tasks by controlling remote robotic 
arms.126 
Then in the late 1980s, as the field of robotic surgery contin-
ued to grow, the concept of integrating telepresence technology 
into the surgical field was fully realized.127 Initially, the Penta-
gon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) de-
veloped an automated endoscopic system for optimal positioning 
(AESOP), which utilized a robotic arm for endoscopic128 camera 
control,129 coupled with the Hermes voice-activation system, 
                                                                                 
-Treatments/Stereotactic-Brain-Biopsy [https://perma.cc/6EYD-ACHP] (defin-
ing stereotactic brain biopsy as a procedure that allows surgeons to diagnose 
brain abnormalities by removing a small piece of the outermost brain tissue). 
In the years that followed, active devices were progressively used in other sur-
gical applications. Hockstein, supra note 111, at 114 (noting that a few years 
later a computer-guided mill was used to core the femoral head, to receive a hip 
replacement prosthesis, in a hip replacement surgery). See generally Femoral 
Head, SAUNDERS COMPREHENSIVE VETERINARY DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2007) (de-
scribing the femoral head as the rounded, uppermost portion of the femur, 
which moves in the hip joint); Prosthesis, SAUNDERS COMPREHENSIVE VETERI-
NARY DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2007) (describing a prosthesis as an artificial substi-
tute for a missing part, used for functional or cosmetic reasons, or both); Milling 
Machine Definition, Process & Types, ENG’G ARTICLES (Aug. 7, 2015), http:// 
www.engineeringarticles.org/milling-machine-definition-process-types/ 
[https://perma.cc/FU25-7W2U] (defining milling as a process where machine 
cutters rotate to remove material from a work piece). 
 124. See Hockstein, supra note 111, at 115 (noting that NASA began devel-
oping a head-mounted virtual-reality display that would allow users to immerse 
themselves with large sets of data transmitted from aerospace missions). 
 125. See generally Telepresence, TECHOPEDIA (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www 
.techopedia.com/definition/14600/telepresence [https://perma.cc/9JMD-UFDS] 
(defining telepresence as technology that allows a user to appear to be present, 
feel like they are present, or have some effect in a space that the person does 
not physically inhabit). 
 126. See Hockstein, supra note 111, at 115 (noting that Scott Fisher, Ph.D. 
and Joe Rosen, MD initially collaborated with Phil Green, Ph.D. of the Stanford 
Research Institute to cultivate the telepresence system and robotic arms). 
 127. Id.  
 128. William C. Shiel Jr., Medical Definition of Endoscope, MEDICINENET, 
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=3244 [https:// 
perma.cc/N7MJ-XB9G] (defining an endoscope as a rigid or flexible instrument 
that is used to look deep inside the body). 
 129. Hockstein, supra note 111, at 115. 
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which allowed endoscope control by voice command.130 Then, in 
1995 the licensing rights for the AESOP systems were acquired 
by, inter alia, Intuitive Surgical, Inc. (Intuitive),131 and in 1997 
widespread clinical use of telepresence devices was achieved 
when Intuitive introduced its daVinci surgical system.132 The 
system consisted of a remote surgeon console133 and three robot-
ically controlled instruments.134 Building off Intuitive, Com-
puter Motion Inc. introduced the Zeus surgical system in 1999,135 
and in a monumental step for telepresence surgery, the Zeus sys-
tem was used to complete the first ever transatlantic surgical 
procedure in 2001.136 Zeus was used to perform a cholecystec-
tomy137 on a patient in France by a surgeon seated 3,800 miles 
away in New York.138 
In 2003, Computer Motion was acquired by Intuitive139 and, 
over the past several decades, numerous improvements have 
been made to the daVinci system.140 Today, the daVinci system 
has been Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved for a 
                                                                                 
 130. Id. (noting that in 1994, the AESOP/Hermes platform achieved Food 
and Drug Administration approval, and was the first actively marketed telero-
botic system). 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. See id. (describing the surgeon console as consisting of two viewers, one 
for each eye, which provide a three-dimensional view of the operating field). 
 134. See id. (describing the three robotically controlled instruments as con-
sisting of a tower, with three multiply jointed [sic] arms; two of the arms con-
trolled a variety of small surgical instruments and the third arm controlled a 
binocular video endoscope). 
 135. See id. at 116 (noting that the Zeus system differed from the daVinci 
system primarily in the configuration of the surgeon’s workstation, allowing the 
surgeon to sit at a console and wear polarized goggles to view the operative field 
in three dimensions). 
 136. Id.  
 137. Cholecystectomy (Gallbladder Removal), MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 10, 2018), 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/cholecystectomy/about/pac 
-20384818 [https://perma.cc/93U6-Z34W] (defining a cholecystectomy as a sur-
gical procedure to remove the gallbladder, an organ that sits just below the liver 
on the upper right side of the abdomen). 
 138. Hockstein, supra note 111, at 116. 
 139. Id. (mentioning that after Computer Motion was acquired by Intuitive, 
the Zeus system was no longer commercially available). 
 140. Id. (noting that improvements to the daVinci system include the addi-
tion of a fourth robotic arm that allows surgeons to toggle between instruments, 
an increased number of surgical instruments that can be used in combination 
with the system, and the addition of an interactive video display). 
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variety of general, cardiac, and urologic procedures,141 and its 
streamlined platform, small instrumentation, and remote tele-
monitoring has been described as offering the potential for the 
healthcare industry to truly attain minimally invasive sur-
gery.142  
Ultimately, in the century following robots’ initial introduc-
tion into society through literary works, unimaginable advances 
of the “second Industrial Revolution” have transformed what 
was once viewed as science fiction into today’s reality. Corre-
spondingly, as the healthcare industry has aimed to leverage the 
prospective benefits of telepresence surgical robotics, the legal 
field has faced complex questions surrounding the applicability 
of existing products liability doctrines, and has been tasked with 
determining whether there is a need for existing doctrines to 
evolve in response. 
II.  THE MALFUNCTION THEORY OF PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY AND ITS DIVERSE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK 
OVER THE PAST FIFTY YEARS   
Analogous to the historic developments of many of the doc-
trines that surround products liability law, technological ad-
vances over the past century have significantly impacted the 
malfunction theory of products liability.143 This Part explores the 
current legal landscape surrounding the malfunction theory, 
first by describing the theory’s diverse doctrinal framework, and 
then specifically outlining how the doctrine has been applied in 
medical device cases. Section A outlines instances where mal-
function theory concepts have been applied broadly, narrowly, 
and in a nuanced manner. Then, Section B examines the sparse 
case law surrounding the applicability of the malfunction theory 
to medical device cases, highlights some of the evidentiary 
                                                                                 
 141. Id.  
 142. See id. at 116–17 (noting that the healthcare industry policies sur-
rounding clinical outcomes research and “do[ing] no harm” will likely promote 
further research and development in the field of surgical robotics for years to 
come). 
 143. See generally Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 299–305 (illustrating 
differences in malfunction theory cases over the past century, and noting that 
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY has informed the de-
velopment of the malfunction theory). 
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boundaries that courts have delineated in those cases, and con-
cludes by examining the applicability of the theory to surgical 
robotics. 
A. THE BROAD AND NARROW FRAMEWORKS SURROUNDING THE 
MALFUNCTION THEORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE 
MODERN TREND TOWARD A MORE NUANCED APPROACH 
As aforementioned, the three-pronged malfunction theory 
test allows a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, and the 
factfinder may infer a product defect, with evidence that shows 
a malfunction, eliminates abnormal use, and eliminates reason-
able secondary causes.144 Since the malfunction theory allows a 
plaintiff to present circumstantial evidence to establish a prima 
facie case, the theory operates like a quasi-rule of evidence.145 As 
a result, courts’ interpretations of the rules of evidence, their 
perspectives on Restatement (Second) of Torts and Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability,146 and their evidentiary as-
sessments as to whether a defect was most likely attributable to 
the manufacturer, improper maintenance by the user, another 
party’s negligence, and/or simply the result of an accident, has 
resulted in a spectrum of cases that illustrate that this area of 
law remains unsettled.147  
1. Cases Supporting a Broad Application of the Malfunction 
Theory of Products Liability 
Advances over the years have not only resulted in increas-
ingly complex products, but also in a subsequent body of law that 
supports a broad application of the malfunction theory.148 Rooted 
                                                                                 
 144. Id. at 298–99. 
 145. See id. at 299 (noting that the malfunction theory implicates permissi-
ble inferences for the factfinder absent direct evidence, and the theory essen-
tially operates as a rule of evidence). 
 146. See id. (noting that the rules of evidence and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY have contributed to the development of the mal-
function theory). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 
3 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (permitting circumstantial evidence to be used to sup-
port an inference of a product defect); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965) (permitting the factfinder to infer that the harm suffered 
by a plaintiff was caused by the negligence of the manufacturer).  
 147. See Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 300 (stating that the malfunc-
tion theory has been applied both narrowly and broadly by different courts, and 
the state of the doctrine remains in flux). 
 148. For an in-depth analysis of cases that implicate analogous malfunction 
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in strong policy considerations, akin to res ipsa loquitur, and in-
fluenced by § 328D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, courts 
have historically demonstrated a willingness to allow cases in-
volving complex products and remote plaintiffs to proceed to the 
jury, absent proof of any specific defect.149 Furthermore, courts 
have also traditionally exhibited a willingness to allow these 
cases to proceed, despite remote plaintiffs’ inability to eliminate 
other reasonable secondary causes of a malfunction.150  
For example, in Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft 
Corp., the Eighth Circuit reversed a judgment for defendant air-
craft manufacturer, despite an accident report that listed three 
possible causes of a fatal crash.151 The court stated that there is 
no “requirement that [the plaintiff] show the specific defect 
which caused the crash . . . [i]f [the plaintiff] can show that the 
crash was caused by some unspecified defect and that no other 
cause is likely, [they have] made a submissible case.”152 Alt-
hough the aircraft manufacturer offered testimony that sup-
ported the pilot’s disorientation was an alternative cause,153 the 
                                                                                 
theory concepts, and support a broad application see the discussion in id. at 
300–01.  
 149. See, e.g., Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 
1994) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanding 
a strict products liability case, despite the plaintiff’s inability to prove a specific 
defect that caused a jar of peanuts to shatter as the plaintiff was replacing the 
cap); Liberty Mut. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 A.2d 1254, 1254 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. 1979) (affirming the trial court’s decision to allow a strict products lia-
bility case to proceed to the jury, despite an unspecified defect); Cassisi v. May-
tag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (remanding for further 
proceedings a strict products liability action based on a malfunction itself, de-
spite the plaintiff’s inability to identify a specific defect); Moraca v. Ford, 332 
A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. 1975) (affirming the Appellate Division’s remand to permit 
a products liability case to proceed to the jury, despite the plaintiff’s inability to 
point to a specific defect). 
 150. See Welge, 17 F.3d at 211 (stating that a “plaintiff in a products liability 
suit is not required to exclude every possibility . . . that the defect which led to 
the accident was caused by someone other than one of the defendants,” and re-
manding the case despite facts supporting alternative causes); Cassisi, 396 So. 
2d at 1142–43 (reversing the grant of summary judgment for the defendant, and 
allowing the case to proceed to the jury, despite the plaintiff’s expert being un-
able to negate other causes of a dryer fire). 
 151. 460 F.2d 631, 634 (8th Cir. 1972); see also id. at 634 n.2 (noting that the 
report concluded that the cause of the accident was undetermined, but that 
three possible causes existed, including pilot disorientation, stall/spin, and ma-
terial failure). 
 152. Id. at 640. 
 153. Id. at 634 n.2. 
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Eighth Circuit indicated that the lower court was correct in al-
lowing the case to proceed to the jury, stating that it is the fact-
finder’s job to “evaluat[e] and weigh[] . . . competing and often 
conflicting circumstances.”154 The court stressed that there 
would be “little gain to the consuming public if the courts would 
establish a form of recovery with one hand and take it away with 
the other by establishing impossible standards of proof.”155  
Similarly, in Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii reversed a directed verdict for defend-
ants, an automobile distributor and a manufacturer, despite a 
rental agency admitting to pre-rental vehicle inspections that 
were limited to fifteen minutes.156 The court stated that alt-
hough “[t]he most convincing evidence is an expert’s pinpointing 
the defect . . . [i]f no such opinion is possible . . . the user’s testi-
mony on what happened is another method of proving that the 
product was defective.”157 Although evidence was introduced 
that indicated that the rental agency had not performed mainte-
nance tests on the steering assembly prior to renting,158 the court 
stated that a “directed verdict may be granted only when af-
ter . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be 
drawn . . . in [the] plaintiff’s favor, it can be said that there is no 
evidence to support a jury verdict in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”159 
The court concluded the “quantum of evidence . . . was sufficient 
to go to the jury,” and it was for the jury, not the court, to decide 
whether a defect in the car was attributable to the manufacturer 
or distributor, or alternatively, was the result of failure to main-
tain the car on the part of the rental agency.160 
                                                                                 
 154. Id. at 640. 
 155. Id. at 639; see also id. (stating that the proof required in a strict liability 
case must be realistically tailored to the circumstances which caused the form 
of action to be created). 
 156. See 470 P.2d 240, 242 (Haw. 1970) (stating that the rental car company 
testified that they had “thoroughly” inspected and serviced the car upon acquir-
ing it, but later general inspections were limited to fifteen to twenty minutes in 
length). 
 157. Id. at 243; see also id. at 242 (noting that the expert mechanic stated 
that the accident “might well have caused the damage to the parts or, con-
versely, their failure might have caused the accident”). 
 158. See id. at 242 (stating that later general inspections were limited to 
fifteen to twenty minutes in length). 
 159. Id. at 244. 
 160. Id. at 244–45. 
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As Lindsay, Stewart, and other cases like them indicate, 
over the past half-century courts have historically demonstrated 
a willingness to adopt a res ipsa loquitur-like approach to the 
malfunction theory in cases involving industrially complex prod-
ucts and remote users. In these cases, courts embrace a res ipsa 
loquitur-like inference that a product defect “speaks for itself,” 
based on the attenuated relationship between manufacturers 
and end users, the presence of inter-industry intermediaries, 
and the innate complexities of the products. Moreover, founded 
on res ipsa loquitur-like policy concerns regarding “establishing 
impossible standards of proof,”161 courts in these cases have tra-
ditionally allowed the case to proceed to the jury despite plain-
tiffs’ failure to identify a specific defect and/or eliminate all po-
tential secondary causes.162 
2. Cases Supporting a Narrow Application of the Malfunction 
Theory of Products Liability 
In contrast to cases like Lindsay and Stewart, recently schol-
ars have advocated for,163 and courts have adopted,164 a much 
narrower approach to the malfunction theory. Founded on strong 
policy concerns regarding converting product sellers into product 
insurers,165 and influenced by a strict reading of § 3 of the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts,166 courts over the past several dec-
ades have shown a reluctance in allowing cases to proceed based 
                                                                                 
 161. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 639 (8th 
Cir. 1972). 
 162. See Menage, supra note 83, at 366–67. 
 163. See Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 302 (noting that the opinion of 
the authors is that a more restrictive application of the malfunction theory is 
the better-reasoned approach). 
 164. See generally Walker v. Gen. Elec. Co., 968 F.2d 116, 120 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(affirming the decision of the district court to grant defendant summary judg-
ment, reasoning that the plaintiff failed to meet their burden of eliminating sec-
ondary reasonable causes for a toaster malfunction). 
 165. See Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 302 (stating that there is a 
danger that broad application of the malfunction theory may have the effect of 
converting product sellers into “insurers”). This contention is founded on the 
risk spreading theory of products liability, which purports that if courts impose 
liability on manufactures for a broader range of product injuries, manufacturers 
will in turn increase the price of products so as to spread the cost of losses to the 
purchaser; thus, the increased pricing acts as an insurance premium for con-
sumers. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders, 
81 KY. L.J. 687, 705 (1992). 
 166. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601–02 (Tex. 2004) 
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on circumstantial evidence.167 Moreover, more recently courts 
have also demonstrated an unwillingness to allow cases involv-
ing remote plaintiffs to proceed to the jury, absent sufficient ev-
idence to eliminate all reasonable secondary causes of a product 
malfunction.168 
For example, in Martin v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment for a distributor, 
and held that the plaintiff had failed to offer sufficient evidence 
to survive a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a 
lighter that caught fire in the plaintiff’s pocket.169 Although the 
Eighth Circuit reiterated that a plaintiff is not required to point 
to a specific defect in order to survive a motion for summary 
judgment,170 the court stated that because the plaintiff failed to 
offer sufficient evidence to “answer the basic question of whether 
the accident occurred because of a potential defect in the lighter, 
or because of something like wear and tear or misuse” summary 
judgment was proper.171 The court noted that unless the evi-
dence presented “induce the mind to pass beyond conjecture as 
to liability for a defect,” a case cannot be made for the trier of 
facts.172 
Similarly, in Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, the Supreme Court 
of Texas affirmed a grant of summary judgment for an automo-
bile manufacturer in a case involving a pick-up truck that 
started on fire, resulting in second-degree burns to the plain-
tiff.173 Although the court noted that only a “scintilla of evidence” 
                                                                                 
(citing § 3 and noting that the drafters of the Restatement were aware of tem-
poral limitations on the malfunction theory and the importance of eliminating 
alternative causes). 
 167. For an in-depth discussion of cases where courts were hesitant to allow 
cases to procced based on circumstantial evidence see Raymond & Allen, supra 
note 85, at 302 n.21. 
 168. See generally Ruminer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 483 F.3d 561, 561–65 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (upholding the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendant car manufacturer because the plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evi-
dence to eliminate other potential causes, including the plaintiff not wearing 
their seat belt properly, wear and tear, or “some other condition arising after 
the vehicle left the control of General Motors.”). 
 169. 464 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 170. See id. at 830 (“While proof of the specific defect may not be required, 
the mere fact of an accident, standing alone, does not make out a case that the 
product was defective.” (citations omitted)). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 831 (citations omitted). 
 173. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 599 (Tex. 2004) (stating 
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is needed to survive a motion for summary judgment,174 the 
court discredited the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence175 and 
concluded that because the plaintiff failed to provide direct evi-
dence relating to the cause of the fire, the evidence was insuffi-
cient to survive a motion for summary judgment.176 The court 
stated that because the plaintiff “could not rule out part of the 
fuel system as a possible cause” of the fire, and because “the 
product’s age [and the] presence of modifications or repairs” did 
not support an inference of a product defect,177 the plaintiff failed 
to meet the burden necessary to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.178  
As Martin, Ridgway, and more recent cases like them illus-
trate, technological advances, increases in inter-industrial inter-
actions, and the underlying principles embodied in § 3 have led 
courts over more recent years to adopt a much stricter approach 
to the malfunction theory.179 In these cases, courts are reluctant 
to rely on circumstantial evidence to infer a product defect ab-
sent sufficient evidence to eliminate wear and tear, a product’s 
age, or the presence of repairs as possible secondary causes of a 
malfunction.180 Moreover, founded on strong concerns surround-
ing imposing liability on manufactures for a broader range of 
product injuries, courts have become more hesitant to allow 
cases involving remote plaintiffs to proceed to the jury based on 
circumstantial evidence and/or absent evidence to eliminate all 
reasonable secondary causes.181 
                                                                                 
that the accident occurred when the plaintiff was driving home, below the speed 
limit, on a paved road). 
 174. Id. at 600. 
 175. Id. at 601 (stating simply that the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence 
does not exceed a scintilla). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 601–02. 
 178. See id. at 602; see also id. at 600 (stating that the plaintiff’s expert con-
cluded the fire originated in the engine compartment and opined it was a mal-
function of the electrical system; but failed to eliminate portions of the fuel sys-
tem as a possible cause of the accident). 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 601–02 (refusing to use circumstantial evidence and § 3 
of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS). 
 180. Martin v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 464 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 2006); Ridg-
way, 135 S.W.3d at 601. 
 181. See Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 302 n.21 (citing cases where 
courts have been unwilling to allow cases to proceed based on circumstantial 
evidence, or instances where plaintiffs have not sufficiently eliminated reason-
able secondary causes). 
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3. A More Moderate Approach to the Malfunction Theory of 
Products Liability 
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, although the utility of 
the malfunction theory has remained in flux over the years, one 
thing that has remained constant is courts’ willingness to look to 
the Restatements for guidance.182 Some courts and scholars have 
opined that § 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Li-
ability indicates that circumstantial evidence, and the malfunc-
tion theory, is only applicable in cases that involve new prod-
ucts183 that have not been subject to subsequent maintenance or 
repairs,184 and where the possibility of third-party or user negli-
gence have been sufficiently ruled out as an alternative cause.185 
However, other courts have considered § 3 and its comments, 
and adopted a more flexible “totality of the circumstances” ap-
proach to the malfunction theory.186 
For example, in Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. Deere & Co. the Supreme Court of Connecticut re-
versed the lower court’s finding in a case involving a tractor fire 
that destroyed the insured’s home, and held that the insurer did 
not provide sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.187 In coming to its decision the court articulated a 
more nuanced approach to the malfunction theory,188 stating 
                                                                                 
 182. See Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 603 (noting that comments to § 3 and the 
cases cited in support of it illustrate the kinds of considerations courts have 
taken into account in deciding whether to allow an inference of pre-sale defect 
in a product). 
 183. See Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 304 n.24 (noting that “[n]ot-
withstanding the vagueness in the Restatement (Third), it is noteworthy that, 
in every illustration in the commentary to § 3 in which the Restatement (Third) 
indicates that liability is warranted, the accident involves a new product.”); see 
also Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying New 
York’s law similar to § 3 to excuse a plaintiff from proving a specific defect, in-
stead inferring a defect from proof that a six-day-old vehicle did not perform as 
intended); Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 56 (N.J. 1999) (adopting § 3 in a 
case involving a collapsed five-week-old chair); Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 601 
(noting that even if § 3 were Texas law, “it would generally apply only to new or 
almost new products”). 
 184. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600–01. 
 185. Id. at 600. 
 186. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co., 25 A.3d 571, 588 n.15 
(Conn. 2011) (noting “that this approach is different from the approach taken 
by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, § 3”). 
 187. Id. at 571. 
 188. Id. at 583–84 (“[A] jury may rely on circumstantial evidence to infer 
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that a plaintiff may prove a product defect through various forms 
of circumstantial evidence, including history and use of the par-
ticular product, the manner in which the product malfunctioned, 
similar malfunctions in similar products that negate the possi-
bility of other causes, the age of the product in relation to its life 
expectancy, and the most likely causes of the malfunction.189 The 
court noted that when the totality of the plaintiff’s evidence is 
“sufficient to establish that it is more probable than not that the 
plaintiff’s injury was caused by a defect . . . that can fairly be at-
tributed to the manufacturer,” cases relying on the malfunction 
theory should proceed to the jury.190 Although the insurer in Met-
ropolitan was unable to provide sufficient evidence to eliminate 
reasonable secondary causes,191 Metropolitan and cases like it192 
indicate that in cases involving complex products and intercon-
nected parties, some more progressive courts are willing to adopt 
a more nuanced approach to the malfunction theory and the use 
of circumstantial evidence.193 
                                                                                 
that a product that malfunctioned was defective at the time it left the manufac-
turer’s or seller’s control if the plaintiff presents evidence establishing that (1) 
the incident that caused the plaintiff’s harm was of a kind that ordinarily does 
not occur in the absence of a product defect, and (2) any defect most likely ex-
isted at the time the product left the manufacture’s or seller’s control and was 
not the result of other reasonably possible causes not attributable to the manu-
facturer or seller.”). 
 189. Id. at 584. 
 190. Id. at 589. 
 191. See id. at 590–92 (noting that the dealer’s technician testified that he 
performed a tune-up and found no problems or deficiencies, and that the tune-
up was performed according to manufacturer specification supplied by the de-
fendant; however, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to remove the 
possibility that the “work performed on the tractor could not have damaged or 
caused problems with the tractor’s electrical system”). 
 192. See, e.g., Karazin v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 3:17-cv-823 (JBA), 2018 
WL 4398250, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 14, 2018) (applying the Metropolitan frame-
work in a case surrounding the malfunction of an artificial hip replacement de-
vice); Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watkins Mfg. Co., 3:13-cv-123 (JBA), 2015 
WL 3397844, at *8 (D. Conn. May 26, 2015) (applying the Metropolitan ap-
proach in a case surrounding a house fire that was caused by a hot tub malfunc-
tion); Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Eaton Elec., Inc., 3:11-cv-1741 (CSH), 2015 WL 
233032, at *8–10 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2015) (applying the Metropolitan “totality 
of the circumstances” framework to a case surrounding a house fire resulting 
from a faulty electricity circuit meter). 
 193. See generally Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 303–05 (noting that 
Metropolitan represented a more recent, nuanced approach to the malfunction 
theory).  
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B. THE SPARSE CASE LAW SURROUNDING THE MALFUNCTION 
THEORY IN MEDICAL DEVICE CASES AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
SURGICAL ROBOTICS  
Ironically, scholars have noted that the malfunction theory 
and subsequently § 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability emanated from a seminal medical device case.194 
However, unlike the doctrinal boundaries and vast body of case 
law that have developed in other industries,195 courts have had 
limited opportunities196 to evaluate the applicability of the mal-
function theory and subsequently § 3 in medical device cases.197 
Furthermore, unlike other industries, the complexities sur-
rounding medical devices, physician-patient interactions, and 
the nature of the human body have inevitably strained courts to 
make difficult evidentiary determinations on whether product 
defects and resulting injuries are attributable to device manu-
facturers, improper maintenance by healthcare providers, phy-
sician negligence, and/or simply the result of a patients’ anat-
omy. As a result, over the years courts have struggled to consist-
ently apply the malfunction theory in medical device cases. 
                                                                                 
 194. Earlier drafts of the Restatement (Third) of Torts stems principally from 
Pennsylvania law, specifically Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 565 
A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989), a case in which the court first articulated the malfunction 
theory of products liability. See Jonathan M. Hoffman, Res Ipsa Loquitur and 
Indeterminate Product Defects: If They Speak for Themselves, What Are They 
Saying?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 353, 371 (1995). 
 195. See generally Martin v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 464 F.3d 827, 828 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (relating to a cigarette lighter defect); Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Deere & Co., 25 A.3d 571, 577–78 (Conn. 2011) (relating to a tractor electrical 
defect); Liberty Mutual Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 A.2d 1254, 1255–56 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (relating to a television defect); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 
396 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (relating to a dryer defect); 
Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 332 A.2d 599, 600 (N.J. 1975) (relating to automobile 
defect). 
 196. See generally Rogers, 565 A.2d at 754 (representing the first case where 
the malfunction theory was adopted, specifically in a medical device case). It is 
also important to note that a Westlaw search of citing references to Rogers v. 
Johnson & Johnson revealed that only sixteen citing cases contained the words 
“medical” and/or “device” in them as of January 10, 2019. 
 197. Id. It is also important to note that a refined Westlaw search of the 
cases that cited Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson and also included the words “med-
ical” and “circumstantial” was limited to ten cases as of January 10, 2019. 
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1. The Malfunction Theory and Its Diverse Application in 
Medical Device Cases 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first articulated the 
malfunction theory of strict products liability in Rogers v. John-
son & Johnson,198 a case involving a patient that was burned by 
plaster used to temporarily set his leg.199 Despite the manufac-
turer introducing evidence of physician negligence, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court’s decision,200 and 
stated that a medical device manufacturer is not entitled to a 
directed verdict on the malfunction theory when it introduces 
“evidence of secondary causation, i.e., medical malprac-
tice . . . .”201 The court reasoned that it was “altogether possible 
that a plaintiff’s injuries could be caused jointly by a defective 
product, and also by third party negligence, so long as the negli-
gence does not constitute a supervening cause of the malfunc-
tion.”202 A dissenting judge harshly criticized the majority’s hold-
ing as being a “res ipsa loquitur”-type approach, and stated that 
the survival of a plaintiff’s “cause of action depends upon [] es-
tablishing that nothing outside of the product itself caused the 
malfunction . . . .”203 The judge reasoned that evidence of physi-
cian negligence should be considered fatal because “if a ‘second-
ary cause’ created the malfunction, the product itself was not de-
fective and the products liability claim would fail.”204 Ultimately, 
this tension between the majority and dissenting opinions in 
                                                                                 
 198. Id. at 754 (articulating the malfunction theory as allowing a plaintiff to 
“prove a defect in a product with evidence of the occurrence of a malfunction 
and with evidence eliminating abnormal use or reasonable, secondary causes 
for the malfunction”); see also id. at 753–54 (stating that although the superior 
court has considered the malfunction theory of strict liability, the supreme court 
had never fully adopted it prior to their current decision). 
 199. Id. at 752. 
 200. See id. at 751 (noting that the superior court reversed the lower court’s 
decision to allow the case to proceed to the jury, and held that the case should 
not have been submitted to the jury in light of evidence of negligence on the part 
of the physicians). 
 201. See id. at 754 (stating that the supreme court “cannot agree with this 
circular logic as it essentially mandates the grant of a directed verdict should 
the defendant manufacturer produce any evidence of reasonable, secondary cau-
sation”). 
 202. Id. at 755. 
 203. See id. at 755–56 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority as 
using a “res ipsa loquitur”-type approach in its analysis, and emphasizing a 
narrow application of the malfunction theory). 
 204. Id. at 756. 
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Rogers foreshadowed decades of seemingly similar medical de-
vice cases that proceeded to markedly different stages of litiga-
tion, largely based on courts’ differing approaches to the mal-
function theory and the evidentiary requirements needed to per-
mit an inference of a product defect. 
For example, in Wiggins v. Synthes (U.S.A.), a case involving 
surgical screws that broke in a patient’s leg, the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of 
the patient, despite evidence of secondary causes.205 Although 
the manufacturer introduced evidence indicating that the pa-
tient’s non-union of bones could have caused the surgical screws 
to be “ineffective,” rather than defective,206 the superior court in-
dicated that the lower court was correct in allowing the case to 
proceed to the jury.207 The court reasoned that there was enough 
“evidence to support a conclusion . . . that the non-union of the 
bones did not cause the surgical screws to break,” and concluded 
that the evidence supported the finding that the screws failed to 
perform as reasonably expected.208 Similarly, in Banks v. Colo-
plast Corp., a case concerning the malfunction of an implanted 
inflatable prosthesis, the court denied the manufacturer’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, despite allegations of patient mis-
use and surgical team negligence.209 Although the manufacturer 
alleged that the prosthetic device was implanted by a surgical 
team, and it was possible that the device was damaged or im-
planted incorrectly, the court concluded that the argument 
“merely raise[d] a genuine issue of material fact . . . [that did] 
not support an entry of summary judgment . . . .”210  
Conversely, in Moeller v. Danek Medical, Inc., a case involv-
ing a pedicle screw that broke in a patient’s spine, the District 
Court of Pennsylvania granted the manufacturer’s motion for 
summary judgment based on the patient’s inability to eliminate 
a possible secondary cause.211 The manufacturer presented evi-
                                                                                 
 205. 29 A.3d 9, 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). 
 206. Id. at 15. 
 207. Id. at 17. 
 208. Id. at 16–18. 
 209. CIV. A. 10-5048, 2012 WL 651867, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2012). 
 210. Id. at *4. 
 211. CIV.A. 94-967, 1997 WL 1039333, at *3–4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 
1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir. 1998). 
  
1074 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1041 
 
dence indicating that the patient had engaged in physical activ-
ity months after the surgery,212 and the court concluded that the 
patient did not meet the burden of proving the “absence of ab-
normal use or reasonable secondary causes” so as to allow the 
case to proceed to the jury.213 Moreover, in Bowman v. American 
Medical Systems, Inc., a case concerning a penile prosthesis that 
malfunctioned and was removed, the district court granted the 
manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment based on spolia-
tion of evidence.214 The court concluded that because the attend-
ing physician “spoliated the removed [p]rosthesis,”215 and the 
manufacturer did not have an opportunity to examine the device 
for “damage between the time of manufacture and the time of 
the implantation procedure,” nor an opportunity to examine 
whether “the alleged failure . . . was caused by improper implan-
tation of the device,” the manufacturer was “severely prejudiced” 
and entitled to a grant of summary judgment.216  
A comparison of Wiggins, Banks, Moeller, and Bowman il-
lustrates that over the years courts have struggled to consist-
ently apply the malfunction theory in medical device cases. In 
cases like Wiggins and Banks, courts have adopted a Rogers ma-
jority-like approach and have allowed cases to proceed based on 
evidence indicating that a malfunction may be the result of a de-
fective product, but also a concurrent cause, including physiolog-
ical factors, patient misuse, or surgical team negligence. Con-
versely, in cases like Moeller and Bowman, courts have adopted 
a Rogers dissent-like approach and have only allowed cases to 
proceed if there is sufficient evidence to eliminate other reason-
able secondary causes of a malfunction, including patient mis-
use, physician negligence, and/or improper implantation. Ulti-
mately, as foreshadowed by Rogers, the differing judicial ap-
proaches to the malfunction theory have resulted in decades of 
similar medical device cases that have proceeded to different 
                                                                                 
 212. See id. at *3 (stating that the doctor told the patient not to do any heavy 
lifting following his surgery; however, months later the plaintiff attempted to 
lift a bench). 
 213. Id. at *4. 
 214. CIV. A. 96-7871, 1998 WL 721079, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1998). 
 215. Id. at *1; see also id. (noting that the patient requested that the physi-
cian preserve the prosthesis so it could be examined to determine the cause of 
it breaking; however, the physician spoilated the prosthesis before any exami-
nation could be performed). 
 216. Id. at *3–6. 
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stages of litigation, resulting in a body of law that still remains 
unclear today. 
2. The Malfunction Theory and Its Application in a Surgical 
Robotic Setting 
As previously indicated, the complexities surrounding med-
ical devices, physician-to-patient interaction, and the nature of 
the human body, combined with the difficult evidentiary deter-
minations surrounding whether product defects and resulting 
injuries are attributable to medical device manufacturers, 
healthcare providers, attending physicians, and/or patients have 
inevitably led to a range of applications of the malfunction the-
ory in the medical field.217 Moreover, recently an additional fac-
tor has been added to these complexities: robotics.218 As a result, 
modern advances in surgical robotics and the gradual adoption 
of telepresence surgical techniques have recently challenged 
courts to test the applicability of the malfunction theory and its 
adjacent concepts in cases involving telepresence surgical ro-
bots.219 
One of the first cases to explore the applicability of the mal-
function theory to the field of telepresence surgical robotics was 
Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hospital.220 In Mracek, Roland Mracek 
sued robot manufacturer, Intuitive Surgical, Inc., after the 
daVinci surgical system failed to function during a routine pros-
tatectomy.221 Roland argued that a product defect could be in-
ferred from the daVinci’s repeated “error” messages, and the sur-
gical and manufacturing teams’ inability to restart the sys-
tem.222 Although the district court stated that the “malfunction 
theory does not require a plaintiff to proffer expert testimony to 
prove how the product was defective,”223 the court rejected Ro-
land’s contention that a defect was “obvious.”224 Instead, the 
                                                                                 
 217. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 218. See generally supra Part I.C.2. (discussing recent advances in robotics 
within the medical field, specifically in the field of surgical robotics). 
 219. See, e.g., Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(suing a surgical robot manufacturer). 
 220. 610 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 221. Id. at 403. 
 222. Id. at 405. 
 223. Id. at 408. 
 224. Id. at 407. 
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court relied on Intuitive’s assertion that the “use and timing of 
various ancillary medical equipment in connection with 
this . . . complex procedure reinforces that any number of rea-
sonable secondary causes could or were responsible for the al-
leged damages,”225 and concluded that Roland had failed to offer 
sufficient evidence to “eliminate any reasonable secondary 
causes.”226 In addition, the court noted that what was also “fatal 
to Mracek’s cause of action”227 was the fact that the attending 
physician’s operative report did not “include any causation be-
tween the problems with the robot and Mracek’s erectile dys-
function.”228 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment, and simply stated that “summary 
judgment was proper because [the plaintiff had] . . . failed to 
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact.”229 Although the 
Third Circuit noted that expert evidence is “unnecessary where 
testimony . . . may enable the jury to clearly see the construction 
of the machine and the manner of its use,”230 the court indicated 
that Roland’s evidence of repeated “error” messages was insuffi-
cient to permit the jury to “clearly see” a product defect.231 Inter-
estingly, the Third Circuit appeared to gloss over the sufficiency 
of Roland’s evidence regarding proof of a product defect, and fo-
cused much of its analysis on proof of causation, stating that 
there was insufficient evidence to “permit a jury to infer [the 
plaintiff’s injuries] were caused by the robot’s alleged malfunc-
tion.”232  
Given the different points of emphasis between the district 
court and Third Circuit’s analyses, combined with the uncertain-
ties surrounding the amount of evidence necessary to survive a 
motion for summary judgment in surgical robotics cases follow-
ing Mracek, the legal field will inevitably be forced to evaluate 
                                                                                 
 225. Id. at 408. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 406. 
 228. Id. at 407. 
 229. Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 F. App’x 925, 927 (3d Cir. 2010) (not-
ing that separate from whether summary judgment was proper because the 
plaintiff failed to produce expert reports, it was proper because he failed to 
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material facts). 
 230. Id. (quoting Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 415–16 (3d Cir. 
1999)). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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the applicability of the malfunction theory to surgical robotics 
cases involving remote plaintiffs as telepresence surgery be-
comes increasingly common. Furthermore, in light of recent Su-
preme Court decisions involving plaintiffs’ ability to bring state-
law tort claims against medical device manufacturers233 and un-
certainties surrounding the preemptive reach of the Medical De-
vice Amendments of 1976,234 the legal field will be forced to 
reevaluate the utility of existing products liability doctrines in 
cases involving telepresence surgical robotics as surgical robot 
manufacturers continue to develop new and innovative products. 
III.  A NEW MALFUNCTION THEORY FOR STRICT 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN SURGICAL ROBOTICS CASES   
Similar to the way the first Industrial Revolution thrust so-
ciety and products liability law into monumental transfor-
mations,235 recent advances in computers and robotics have 
thrust society into a “second Industrial Revolution,”236 one which 
                                                                                 
 233. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43218, PREEMPTION OF DRUG AND MED-
ICAL DEVICE CLAIMS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 22 (2013), https://www.everycrsreport 
.com/files/20130910_R43218_293d4299414c684a953eaae095aa422d603ff682.p
df [https://perma.cc/846E-9Z2V] (noting that following Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 
552 U.S. 312 (2008), lower courts have often concluded that consumers of Class 
III medical devices are preempted from suing device manufacturers on most 
state common law claims if the device receives premarket approval).  
 234. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012) (stating that “no State or political subdivi-
sion of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device in-
tended for human use any requirement—(1) which is different from, or in addi-
tion to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) 
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter”); see also 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 233 (stating that the Court in Riegel v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) 
indicated that state-law claims that are “parallel” to, rather than add to, federal 
requirements are not expressly preempted by the Medical Device Amendments 
of 1976). Although the Court has expressly stated that parallel claims include 
those that provide for “damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of 
FDA regulations,” it has yet to address other state-law tort claims that survive 
federal preemption. Id.  
 235. See, e.g., Zidich, supra note 107, at 919 (noting that the Industrial Rev-
olution presented a conundrum for society, but changed the way people lived 
and worked); see also supra Parts I.A.2–3. (illustrating the developments in 
products liability law and demonstrating how the Industrial Revolution 
changed not only society, but also products liability law). 
 236. Zidich, supra note 107, at 919. 
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requires that products liability law respond accordingly. Alt-
hough the malfunction theory has exhibited minor transfor-
mations over the past several decades,237 the foregoing analysis 
indicates a more progressive approach is needed in order to ade-
quately address the complex legal and technological issues posed 
by contemporary surgical robotics.  
Part III argues that although the court in Mracek applied a 
legal standard that aligns with existing malfunction theory ju-
risprudence, a new standard is needed in the field of surgical ro-
botics. Section A begins by proposing that state courts should 
adopt a new malfunction theory incorporating the use of circum-
stantial evidence and a rebuttable presumption, and further ex-
plains how the proposed doctrine incorporates the ideals that 
prompted historic changes in products liability law into twenty-
first century surgical robotics products liability. Section B 
frames some of the practical concerns surrounding the proposed 
theory, then argues the proposed doctrine best furthers sound 
legal policies and technological improvements in the field of sur-
gical robotics. Finally, Section C applies the proposed doctrine to 
the facts of Mracek and opines as to how the case may have come 
out using the new approach to products liability law. 
A. FROM PAST TO PRESENT: A NEW MALFUNCTION THEORY FOR 
SURGICAL ROBOTICS WHICH USES CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
AND AFFORDS A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
Although the court in Mracek articulated a formulation of 
the malfunction theory that aligns with existing jurispru-
dence,238 an examination of the differences between the district 
court and Third Circuit’s analysis illustrates this area of law still 
remains unclear.239 As a result, this Note proposes that state 
                                                                                 
 237. See generally supra Part I.B. (discussing the advent of proving a prod-
uct defect through circumstantial evidence, and the influence of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability). 
 238. See Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 408 (E.D. Pa. 
2009), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010). (defining the malfunction theory 
as permitting “a plaintiff to prove a defect through circumstantial evidence. 
Plaintiff may raise a supportable inference of defect through: (1) evidence of the 
occurrence of a malfunction; (2) evidence eliminating abnormal use; and (3) ev-
idence eliminating reasonable secondary causes for the accident”). 
 239. As this Note indicates, complexities surrounding surgical robotics, phy-
sician-to-patient interaction, and the nature of the human body, combined with 
difficult evidentiary determinations surrounding whether product defects are 
attributable to medical device manufacturers, healthcare providers, attending 
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courts should adopt a new malfunction theory in the field of sur-
gical robotics, which addresses the issues posed by technological 
advances, in light of the underlying social policies that have his-
torically influenced products liability law.  
1. State Courts Should Adopt a New Burden Shifting 
Mechanism to the Malfunction Theory that Permits the Use of 
Circumstantial Evidence and Affords a Rebuttable 
Presumption 
This Note proposes that, in applying the malfunction theory 
of products liability to surgical robotics, state courts should per-
mit a factfinder to infer a product defect through the occurrence 
of a malfunction in the absence of abnormal use and afford a re-
buttable presumption that there were no reasonable secondary 
causes of the malfunction. Ultimately, the proposed doctrine 
adopts much of the existing jurisprudential framework sur-
rounding the malfunction theory of products liability; however, 
it proposes that state courts should adopt a burden shifting 
mechanism in surgical robotics cases. Although several alterna-
tives exist that could effectuate such change, including the Su-
preme Court interpreting the proposed theory as representing a 
“parallel claim”240 to existing post-market requirements,241 a 
model statute that adopts the proposed doctrine, or a modifica-
tion to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,242 
                                                                                 
physicians, and/or patients, has led courts to formulate different interpretations 
of the malfunction theory and different evidentiary requirements. See supra 
Part II.B.2. Compare Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 F. App’x 925 (focusing 
primarily on the plaintiff’s inability to prove the causation element), with 
Mracek, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (focusing primarily on the plaintiff’s inability to 
eliminate reasonable secondary causes of the malfunction).  
 240. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 233 (noting the Court has 
stated “parallel claims,” which parallel existing federal regulations rather than 
add to them, include those that provide for “damages remedy;” however, the 
Court has yet to definitively outline alternative “parallel claims” that survive 
federal preemption). Some federal courts have held that state claims surround-
ing violations of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 that occur outside of 
the premarket approval process are not preempted by federal regulations; how-
ever, other courts have addressed the same issue and come to varying conclu-
sions. Id. at 23. 
 241. See generally id. (noting that once approved for marketing, manufac-
turers of medical devices must comply with various regulations on labeling and 
advertising, manufacturing, and post-marketing surveillance). 
 242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
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given the malfunction theory’s diverse jurisprudential frame-
work, and because products liability is ultimately a matter of 
state tort law, this Note recommends state courts should pro-
gressively adopt the proposed theory. In doing so, state courts 
will act to test the viability of the proposed theory on a small 
scale, allowing for doctrinal modifications or refinements, which 
may ultimately spur more expansive federal, legislative, or trea-
tise changes. 
Much like existing malfunction theory jurisprudence, the 
proposed theory does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden of prov-
ing all the elements of a product liability claim.243 Rather, it per-
mits the factfinder to infer a product defect attributable to the 
manufacturer through circumstantial evidence.244 Moreover, 
similar to malfunction theory jurisprudence, before a case is per-
mitted to go to the jury, the court must be satisfied the plaintiff’s 
evidence is sufficient to establish the probability, and not the 
mere possibility, that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from a prod-
uct defect attributable to the manufacturer.245  
However, unlike existing malfunction theory jurisprudence, 
and § 3 of Restatement (Third) of Torts,246 the proposed theory 
permits the factfinder to infer a product defect merely from the 
occurrence of a malfunction in the absence of abnormal use. It 
does not require that a plaintiff eliminate reasonable secondary 
causes,247 nor prove “the incident . . . was not . . . solely the result 
of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or 
distribution.”248 Rather, it requires that a robot manufacturer 
demonstrate the existence of a specified secondary cause, either 
through direct evidence or the “totality of the circumstances” ap-
proach.249  
                                                                                 
 243. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co., 25 A.3d 571, 579–81 
(Conn. 2011) (reciting the elements of a products liability claim, and quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A). 
 244. See id. at 580 (noting that the malfunction theory allows the jury to 
infer the existence of a defect using circumstantial evidence). 
 245. Id. at 583. 
 246. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3. 
 247. See Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 408 (E.D. Pa. 
2009), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010) (allowing a plaintiff to raise a sup-
portable inference of defect through, inter alia, evidence eliminating reasonable 
secondary causes for the accident). 
 248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3. 
 249. See Metro. Prop., 25 A.3d at 584 (stating that another approach to the 
malfunction theory is to permit a plaintiff to establish a product defect through 
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2. The Proposed Malfunction Theory Integrates the Same 
Ideals that Induced Historic Changes in Products Liability Law 
into Modern Surgical Robotics  
Similar to the changes in products liability law that resulted 
from the advances of the first Industrial Revolution,250 the pro-
posed malfunction theory incorporates the ideals that influenced 
the evolution of historic doctrinal developments into today’s sur-
gical robotic products liability law.  
Much like the industrial changes in the late 1800s that led 
U.S. courts to transition from caveat emptor to recognizing im-
plied warranties of merchantability,251 the exponential growth of 
robotic technology in the twenty-first century necessitates the 
balance between technological growth and consumer safety 
weigh more in favor of consumers. Analogous to the way U.S. 
courts gradually prioritized consumer safety and reduced the 
doctrinal burdens placed on consumers,252 the proposed theory 
reduces the burden placed on innocent patients by affording a 
rebuttable presumption that there were no reasonable secondary 
causes of a robotic malfunction.  
Similarly, much like the industrial advances of the nine-
teenth century that led the court in MacPherson to diverge from 
its general rule of privity framework,253 advances in surgical ro-
botics, combined with the innate complexities of human-robot in-
teractions, medical procedures, and the nature of the human 
body, demand that end patients be afforded greater protection 
from the inherent dangers of surgical robots.254 Analogous to the 
                                                                                 
evidence of “(1) the history and use of the particular product, (2) the manner in 
which the product malfunctioned, (3) similar malfunctions in similar products 
that may negate the possibility of other causes, (4) the age of the product in 
relation to its life expectancy, and (5) the most likely other causes”). 
 250. See generally supra Parts I.A.2–3. (illustrating how the industrial rev-
olution influenced not only society, but products liability law). 
 251. See generally supra Part I.A.1 (illustrating how expansive industrial 
changes and consumer’s naiveté led to doctrinal changes in U.S. products liabil-
ity law that favored consumer safety). 
 252. In the late 1800s, U.S. courts exhibited a modest shift toward consumer 
safety by recognizing implied warranties in products liability cases. See supra 
Part I.A.1. 
 253. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Throughout the 
1900s, the rise of mass production, introduction of intermediaries into supply 
chain, and expansion of advertising placed a distance between the makers and 
users of products; thus, courts gradually adopted more progressive attitudes to-
ward products liability cases. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 254. In the decades following Winterbottom, U.S. courts slowly began to 
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way the court in MacPherson sought to afford additional protec-
tion to those that were foreseeably expected to suffer an injury 
as a result of a defective product,255 the proposed doctrine em-
ploys a rebuttable presumption, which lessens the burden on pa-
tients, so as to afford increased protection to end patients who 
may foreseeably suffer as a result of a defective robot.  
In addition, much like the commercial transformations of 
the mid-1900s that spurred the development of strict products 
liability,256 recent advances in the healthcare industry have cre-
ated an equally attenuated divide between surgical robot manu-
facturers and end patients who are subject to a robot’s use. Com-
parable to William Prosser’s views throughout the 1900s,257 so-
cial policy demands that surgical robot manufacturers, not inno-
cent end patients, should bear greater responsibility for acci-
dental injuries caused by robots. In light of Prosser’s concerns 
surrounding the social implications of placing excessive burdens 
on product users, the proposed theory affords those that are “en-
titled to the maximum of protection,” innocent end patients, in-
creased protection by shifting more of the onus back to those that 
are “practically and morally, the one[s] to provide it,” surgical 
robot manufacturers.258  
                                                                                 
grant exceptions to the general rule of privity. Initially, courts granted excep-
tions in cases involving products that were imminently or inherently dangerous, 
then in cases where sellers knew a product was inherently dangerous but failed 
to disclose the danger to an unknowing buyer. See supra Part I.A.2. (citing Win-
terbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402). 
 255. See generally supra Part I.A.2. (explaining how MacPherson expanded 
the general rule of privity’s inherently dangerous product exception to include 
things “that [are] reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negli-
gently made,” which opened the courtroom to anyone foreseeably expected to 
suffer an injury as a result of a defective product (quoting MacPherson, 111 N.E. 
at 1053)). 
 256. Throughout the 1900s, the rise of mass production, introduction of in-
termediaries into the supply chain, and expansion of advertising placed a dis-
tance between the makers and users of products; thus, courts gradually adopted 
more progressive attitudes toward products liability cases. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 257. It was “an increased feeling that social policy demands that the burden 
of accidental injuries caused by defective chattels be placed upon the producer” 
that led William Prosser to propose the idea of imposing strict products liability 
in tort law, rather than theories grounded in contract law, implied warranties, 
or negligence. See PROSSER, supra note 61, at 689; supra Part I.A.3. 
 258. PROSSER, supra note 61; see also supra Part I.A.3. 
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Finally, much like the equitable concerns that inspired 
courts in the late-1900s to extend strict products liability protec-
tion to third-party bystanders,259 the proposed theory aims to 
“provide greater protection” to innocent, bystander-esque pa-
tients by shifting the burden of demonstrating a reasonable sec-
ondary cause to those that have the greatest opportunity to in-
spect surgical robots for defects: robot manufacturers. 
B. THE NEW MALFUNCTION THEORY: PRACTICAL CONCERNS 
AND WHY THE NEW DOCTRINE BETTER FURTHERS SOUND LEGAL 
POLICIES AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN THE FIELD OF 
SURGICAL ROBOTICS 
Although the proposed malfunction theory contemplates 
many of the same social concerns that influenced historic devel-
opments in products liability law, it is important to recognize 
that these developments did not occur without resistance.260 As 
a result, this Section aims to address some of the concerns sur-
rounding the proposed theory, and argues the proposed doctrine 
best promotes the underlying principles of the malfunction the-
ory and the strict products liability doctrines, as well as clinical 
and technological advances in the field of surgical robotics. 
1. Manufacturers of Surgical Robots Would Not Turn into 
Insurers, but Rather, Responsible Manufacturers 
One of the most prominent concerns surrounding a broad 
application of the malfunction theory, and analogously the pro-
posed theory’s burden shifting mechanism, is the concern that 
“broad application . . . may have the effect of converting product 
sellers into ‘insurers.’”261 This contention is rooted in the risk 
spreading theory of products liability, which purports that if 
courts impose liability on manufacturers for a broader range of 
                                                                                 
 259. As this Note indicates, bystanders are entitled to greater protection 
than consumers or users since the consumer and users have at least the oppor-
tunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to articles that are 
manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable dealers, 
whereas a bystander ordinarily has no such opportunity. Elmore v. Am. Motors 
Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (en banc); supra Part I.A.3.  
 260. See generally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960) (quoting Chief Jus-
tice Cardozo who stated “T[he] assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding 
in these days apace” and commenting that in the thirty years that followed a 
good part of the citadel held out, despite the continued assault). 
 261. Raymond & Allen, supra note 85, at 302. 
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product injuries, manufacturers will in turn increase the price of 
products so as to spread the cost of losses to the purchasers.262 
Although this concern may ultimately have some validity on the 
whole,263 and in some industries expansive liability and subse-
quent risk-spreading measures may adversely affect consum-
ers,264 in the field of surgical robotics, this proposition is largely 
inappropriate. Instead, the proposed theory would likely result 
in surgical robot manufacturers being held more responsible for 
injuries caused by defective devices.  
More specifically, in light of the healthcare industry’s recent 
adoption of value-based purchasing methods, which reward hos-
pitals with incentive payments based on the quality of care that 
is provided,265 and the advent of risk-based contracting between 
device manufacturers and healthcare providers, which contrac-
tually allocate more financial risk to manufacturers who do not 
satisfy certain performance or clinical outcomes,266 surgical ro-
bot manufacturers are significantly hindered, either commer-
cially or contractually, in their ability to “spread risk” to end pa-
tients. Unlike other industries where there is a quantitatively 
higher likelihood of products liability cases and where expansive 
liability could realistically turn wholesale manufacturers into 
product insurers,267 the ALI has indicated that indeterminate 
                                                                                 
 262. Cochran, supra note 165, at 705. 
 263. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 260, at 1110–11 (indicating courts were 
hesitant to apply the doctrine of strict liability to certain industries, including 
tires, pumps, insecticides, and lumber). 
 264. See Cochran, supra note 165, at 705–06 (noting second-order effects 
that negatively impact consumer choice, including the possibility of manufac-
turers withdrawing products from the market that are not profitable, or adding 
significant “insurance premiums” to product prices that would disproportion-
ately affect low income consumers). 
 265. See Scott Hodgin, Value-Based Purchasing: What Is It?, TXCIN (May 7, 
2018), http://www.insight-txcin.org/post/what-is-value-based-purchasing 
[https://perma.cc/KNX6-Z6ZU] (describing value-based purchasing as a pur-
chasing approach that assesses annual device and system purchasing based on 
clinical outcomes).  
 266. See Jaimy Lee, Devicemakers Explore Risk Contracts with Hospitals, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 6, 2014), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20141206/MAGAZINE/312069964/devicemakers-explore-risk-contracts-with 
-hospitals [https://perma.cc/4CJ2-WCL4] (discussing the trend in the healthcare 
industry for large medical device companies to explore risk-based deals). 
 267. See Prosser, supra note 260, at 1110–11 (noting industries where courts 
were hesitant to apply strict liability out of economic concerns). 
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product defect cases represent a “small number of cases.”268 Re-
search shows medical device and surgical robotics cases repre-
sent an even smaller number of those cases.269 As a result, in the 
presently emerging field of surgical robotics, where commercial 
and contractual limitations obviate risk spreading, and the num-
ber of products liability cases is minimal, the contention that 
broad application of the proposed malfunction theory would have 
the effect of converting surgical robot manufacturers into insur-
ers is likely inaccurate.  
Rather, more appropriately, it is important to remember 
that from a law and public policy perspective, courts and com-
mentators have repeatedly emphasized that the underlying pur-
pose of strict products liability is “to insure that the costs of in-
juries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu-
facturers that put such products on the market rather than by 
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”270 
Given this understanding, circumstantial evidence and the mal-
function theory have historically functioned as ways for plain-
tiffs to offer evidence of a product defect,271 so as to ensure that 
manufacturers bear more responsibility associated with product 
malfunctions. As cases like Lindsay and Stewart272 illustrate, in 
situations where remote users are “powerless” to guarantee the 
maintenance and/or safety of the products they use, a broad ap-
plication of the malfunction theory effectively furthers the un-
derlying purpose of strict liability by ensuring that more respon-
sibility is borne by the manufacturer. Unfortunately, as recent 
medical device cases like Bowman, Moeller, and Mracek273 indi-
cate, a narrow application of the malfunction theory, combined 
                                                                                 
 268. Thursday Morning Session – May 18, 1995, supra note 93. 
 269. See supra Part II.B. (noting the case law regarding the applicability of 
the malfunction theory to medical device cases is limited); see also supra Part 
II.B.2. (discussing the only case surrounding the applicability of the malfunction 
theory to surgical robotics).  
 270. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); 
see also Prosser, supra note 260, at 1122–24. 
 271. Menage, supra note 83, at 379. 
 272. See supra Part II.A. (citing Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft 
Corp., 460 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1972); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 
P.2d 240 (Haw. 1970)).  
 273. See supra Part II.B. (citing Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 
2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 363 Fed. App’x. 925 (3d Cir. 2010); Bowman v. Am. 
Med. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 96–7871, 1998 WL 721079 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1998); 
Moeller v. Danek Med., Inc., No. CIV. A. 94–967, 1997 WL 1039333 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 1, 1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
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with the inherently difficult evidentiary determinations sur-
rounding whether medical device defects and resulting injuries 
are attributable to device manufacturers, healthcare providers, 
attending physicians, and/or patients, inevitably leaves end pa-
tients to bear the devastating costs of medical device malfunc-
tions.274 As a result, unlike in other industries, the complexities 
surrounding surgical robotics, physician-patient interactions, 
and the nature of the human body necessitate that the malfunc-
tion theory be reevaluated in light of the underlying purpose of 
strict products liability. In furtherance of this purpose, the pro-
posed theory’s burden shifting mechanism effectively shifts more 
of the equitable and social costs, as well as responsibility, asso-
ciated with malfunctions away from those that are “powerless to 
protect themselves,” end patients, and back to those “that put 
such products on the market,” surgical robot manufacturers.275 
After all, as the Eighth Circuit has stated, there would be “little 
to gain to the consuming public if the courts would establish a 
form of recovery with one hand and take it away with the other 
by establishing impossible standards of proof.”276 
2. The Proposed Doctrine Would Not Deter Technological 
Advances nor Adoption but Rather Would Ensure Safe 
Advances and Safe Adoptions 
Another concern surrounding broad application of the mal-
function theory and analogously the proposed theory’s burden 
shifting mechanism is that broad application would deter exper-
imental and technological advances, as well as clinical adoption. 
Although these contentions may be founded on realistic con-
cerns,277 in light of the healthcare industry’s existing standards 
                                                                                 
 274. See Mracek, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (granting summary judgment 
against the patient for failure to eliminate reasonable secondary causes for a 
surgical robot malfunction during a prostatectomy). 
 275. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. 
 276. Lindsay, 460 F.2d at 639. 
 277. See, e.g., David R. Geiger, Federal Court Holds Manufacturer of Inves-
tigational Drug and Medical Device Responsible for Clinical Trial Investigator’s 
Allegedly Inadequate Informed Consent Form, FOLEY HOAG (July 16, 2014), 
https://foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2014/july/ 
manufacturer-of-investigational-drug-and-medical-device-responsible-for 
-clinical-trial [https://perma.cc/K4XS-DSAG] (noting the U.S. District Court of 
Massachusetts refused to dismiss a suit against the manufacturer of an inves-
tigational drug based on allegedly inadequate warnings the trial investigator 
provided to patients). 
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and safeguards, combined with the advent of value-based pur-
chasing and risk-based contracts,278 a heightened risk of liability 
to manufacturers under the proposed theory would act to ensure, 
not deter, safe advances and adoption of surgical robotics. 
As a general framework, over the past several decades the 
FDA has established an expansive set of regulations surround-
ing the safety and effectiveness of medical devices in the United 
States.279 For certain devices,280 like surgical robots, the FDA 
has determined general controls are insufficient and require the 
“most stringent” approval processes.281 The FDA has recognized 
that certain devices “present a potential, unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury,”282 and impose stricter premarket approval283 
and post-market review284 requirements on device manufactur-
ers.  
In light of these existing regulations and contractual ar-
rangements, the contention that the proposed doctrine would de-
ter technological advances is likely inappropriate. To begin, the 
proposed doctrine would not impose any additional premarket 
                                                                                 
 278. See Hodgin, supra note 265; see also Lee, supra note 266. 
 279. See Overview of Device Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https:// 
www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory 
-assistance/overview-device-regulation [https://perma.cc/64MM-ZK7U] (outlin-
ing regulatory requirements for medical devices distributed in the United 
States). 
 280. See Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https:// 
www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval 
-pma [https://perma.cc/VD3X-VM7L] (noting Class III devices are those which 
support or sustain human life, are of substantial importance in preventing im-
pairment of human health, or which present a potential, unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury). 
 281. Id. 
 282. See id. (defining Class III medical devices).  
 283. See Overview of Device Regulation, supra note 279 (outlining the FDA 
approval process); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 233 (noting the 
premarket approval process is often described as rigorous and time-consuming, 
requiring submissions to the FDA of information regarding proposed labeling, 
reports of information concerning investigations which have been made to show 
whether or not the device is safe and effective, a description of the manufactur-
ing processes and methods, samples of the device and its components, and in-
formation regarding the components, ingredients, and operating principles of 
the device). 
 284. See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42130, FDA REGU-
LATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42130.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8UQ5-3T2S] (noting the medical device post-market surveil-
lance system includes medical device reporting, post-approval studies, post-
market surveillance studies, and FDA discretionary studies). 
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restrictions on device researchers or manufacturers.285 Rather, 
the proposed doctrine would merely shift the burden to the man-
ufacturer during the post-market stage and impose an obligation 
on the manufacturer to demonstrate the device remained com-
pliant with the FDA’s preexisting regulations. In addition, given 
recent trends in the healthcare industry toward value-based 
purchasing and risk-based agreements, which aim to foster 
transparency between device manufacturers and healthcare pro-
viders regarding clinical outcomes286 and post-market device 
performance,287 the proposed theory’s burden shifting mecha-
nism would supplement existing contractual frameworks, induce 
more intra-industry transparency during the post-market stage, 
and promote more informed second-generation device research 
and development. As a result, in cases like Mracek288 the pro-
posed theory would not only impose on “the manufactur-
ers . . . rather than the injured persons”289 the burden of demon-
strating the existence of a specific reasonable secondary cause, 
but also the tangential burden of demonstrating compliance with 
the FDA’s post-market requirements.290 In such cases, which in-
volve numerous physician-robot and physician-patient interac-
tions, the robot manufacturer would be most likely to provide 
evidence surrounding the history and use of the robot, the man-
ner in which it malfunctioned, whether there have been similar 
malfunctions in the same or similar robots, and/or the age of the 
robot in relation to its life expectancy,291 as well as evidence sur-
                                                                                 
 285. As this Note recognizes, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rie-
gel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), many lower courts have often con-
cluded that consumers of Class III medical devices are prevented from suing 
device manufacturers on state common law claims if the device receives pre-
market approval. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 233. However, it can 
be argued that strict products liability claims are “parallel” to, rather than in 
addition to, federal requirements surrounding post-market compliance with 
FDA regulations, an issue the Supreme Court has yet to decide. 
 286. See Hodgin, supra note 265. 
 287. See Lee, supra note 266. 
 288. See supra Part II.B. (citing Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 
2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 289. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
 290. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 291. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co., 25 A.3d 571, 583–85 
(Conn. 2011) (discussing an approach to establishing liability under malfunc-
tion theory and the factors that can be used to infer a product defect through 
the “totality of the circumstances”). 
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rounding the conduct of the healthcare provider and/or attend-
ing physicians. This evidence, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, is likely to be more exhaustive and more informative than 
evidence offered by an injured patient. Thus, ultimately the pro-
posed theory’s burden shifting mechanism would likely result in 
more valuable evidence surrounding a surgical robot malfunc-
tion, which would likely not deter technological advances, but 
rather foster intra-industry transparency regarding post-market 
device performance and encourage more informed device re-
search and development. 
Similarly, in light of the FDA’s extensive premarket and 
post-market safety standards,292 the clinical and social ad-
vantages of minimally invasive surgery touted by surgical robot 
manufacturers,293 and the minute number of surgical robotics 
cases,294 the contention that the proposed doctrine’s heightened 
risk of liability has the potential to deter clinical adoption is also 
likely improper. With the understanding that the proposed doc-
trine acts as a safeguard to ensure manufacturers market surgi-
cal robots that comply with the FDA’s post-market require-
ments, the proposed theory in essence acts to ensure that 
healthcare providers purchase robots that are safe, effective, and 
remain FDA compliant. Moreover, in light of the rise of value-
based purchasing295 and risk-based contracts,296 the proposed 
theory would also act to alleviate healthcare providers of some 
of the additional risks associated with adopting new robotic tech-
niques. For example, in cases like Mracek297 the proposed doc-
trine would require that those with the most knowledge of the 
robotic system, the manufacturer, not the injured patient, pro-
                                                                                 
 292. See Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 280 (discussing how pre-
market approval requires extensive clinical data and trials). 
 293. See supra Part I.C.2. (highlighting the clinical advantages offered by 
the daVinci surgical system through streamlined platforms, smaller instrumen-
tation, and remote telemonitoring). 
 294. See supra Part III.B.1. (discussing how surgical robotics cases represent 
a limited number of indeterminate products liability cases). 
 295. See Hodgin, supra note 265 (discussing value-based purchasing in the 
healthcare industry based on device value and clinical outcomes). 
 296. See Lee, supra note 266 (discussing the advent of risk-based contracts 
between medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers). 
 297. See supra Part II.B. 
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vide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the post-market de-
vice was not in fact defective,298 or alternatively, that another 
secondary cause was responsible for the malfunction. In such 
cases, the manufacturer would likely present evidence surround-
ing the history and use of the robot, similar malfunctions in sim-
ilar robots, and the manner in which the robot malfunctioned,299 
which may alleviate healthcare providers of the costs and liabil-
ities associated with a malfunction under preexisting risk-based 
agreements. Similarly, in cases like Bowman, where spoliation 
of evidence relieves the manufacturer of liability,300 the proposed 
theory would shift the burden of demonstrating a reasonable sec-
ondary cause of the malfunction to the manufacturer, thus, also 
alleviating healthcare providers of additional costs and liabili-
ties under risk-based agreements. As a result, given the ad-
vantages of minimally invasive robotic surgery, combined with 
the understanding that the proposed doctrine acts to ensure ro-
botic systems are FDA compliant and may alleviate healthcare 
providers of additional risks associated with adopting new sur-
gical techniques, the proposed theory’s burden shifting mecha-
nism will likely not deter, but rather promote safer and more 
expansive clinical adoption of novel surgical robotic techniques.  
C. A NEW MALFUNCTION THEORY APPLIED TO MRACEK V. BRYN 
MAWR HOSPITAL AND THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE 
In applying the proposed theory to the facts of Mracek, it is 
unclear whether the same court would have reached a different 
outcome, largely because of the limited facts provided in the rec-
ord. At the district court level, the court’s dismissal of Mracek’s 
contention that a defect was “obvious because all of [the robot’s] 
components shut down after repeatedly flashing ‘error’ mes-
sages,”301 and reliance on Intuitive’s general assertion that “[the 
                                                                                 
 298. This could likely be demonstrated through presenting evidence sur-
rounding manufacturing standards and/or compliance with company policies. 
 299. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co., 25 A.3d 571, 583–85 
(Conn. 2011) (discussing the “totality of the circumstances” approach to demon-
strating a product defect and listing factors related to inferring a product defect, 
including history and use of the particular product, the manner in which the 
product malfunctioned, similar malfunctions in similar products that negate the 
possibility of other causes, the age of the product in relation to its life expec-
tancy, and the most likely causes of the malfunction). 
 300. See supra Part II.B. 
 301. Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (E.D. Pa. 2009), 
aff’d, 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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surgery was] a matter of complex surgical innovation . . . [and] 
any number of reasonable secondary causes could or were re-
sponsible for the alleged damages,”302 would likely have been in-
sufficient grounds to grant summary judgment. In affording 
Mracek a rebuttable presumption that there were no reasonable 
secondary causes of the malfunction, the district court would 
have required that Intuitive submit additional evidence to 
demonstrate a specified reasonable secondary cause did in fact 
exist. In doing so, Intuitive would have likely been forced to in-
troduce evidence surrounding the history and use of the daVinci 
robot, the manner in which the robot malfunctioned, similar 
malfunctions in similar daVinci products, the age of the robot in 
relation to its life expectancy, and/or had to have opined to the 
most likely cause of the malfunction.303 As a result, the district 
court would have acquired additional valuable evidence sur-
rounding the daVinci malfunction. If the court could not deter-
mine it was “more probable than not” that the malfunction could 
“fairly be attributed” to some other secondary cause not attribut-
able to Intuitive, summary judgment would not have been 
proper.304  
Interestingly, the Third Circuit did not specifically address 
the issue of whether reasonable secondary causes existed; ra-
ther, the court relied heavily on the insufficiency of the evidence 
to “permit a jury to infer [Mracek’s injuries] were caused by the 
robot’s alleged malfunction.”305 As is often the situation in surgi-
cal cases, the complexities surrounding medical devices, physi-
cian-patient interactions, and the nature of the human body 
make proving causation difficult. However, in applying the pro-
posed doctrine to the facts of Mracek, Intuitive would likely have 
had to submit additional evidence at the district court level sur-
rounding the existence of reasonable secondary causes of the 
malfunction. Compared to Mracek, Intuitive would have been 
more likely to submit evidence surrounding the history of the 
robot itself, as well as the conduct of the healthcare provider 
                                                                                 
 302. See id. at 408. 
 303. See Metro. Prop., 25 A.3d at 583–85 (discussing the “totality of the cir-
cumstances” approach to the malfunction theory and outlining factors that can 
be used to infer a product defect). 
 304. See id. at 589. 
 305. See Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 F. App’x at 927 (stating merely 
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and/or the opinions of the attending physician. This evidence 
would have provided, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
more evidence surrounding not only potential secondary causes 
of the malfunction but also additional information surrounding 
the nature of Mracek’s injuries and the causation of such inju-
ries.306  
While it remains unclear whether the results of Mracek 
would have changed under the proposed malfunction theory, it 
is clear there is a need for fundamental change in products lia-
bility law as it applies to the field of telepresence surgical robot-
ics. This Part advises that in assessing products liability cases 
involving telepresence surgical robotics, state courts should re-
flect on the history of products liability and the underlying social 
considerations that led to many of its historic doctrinal develop-
ments, and additionally should consider the expansive techno-
logical advances of the twenty-first century and how contempo-
rary products liability law is (or is not) addressing the most pre-
vailing issues that society faces. In doing so, this Part recom-
mends that in the field of telepresence surgical robotics, state 
courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption, holding that 
when applying the malfunction theory of strict products liability 
to surgical robotics, a product defect can be inferred from the oc-
currence of a malfunction in the absence of abnormal use, raising 
a rebuttable presumption that there were no reasonable second-
ary causes of the malfunction. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Note proposes a change in the malfunction theory doc-
trine of strict products liability as it applies to cases involving 
surgical robotics. This Note advocates for a more nuanced ap-
proach to the malfunction theory, which reflects the underlying 
considerations, which motivated historic developments in prod-
ucts liability law over the past century. In light of recent ad-
vances in computers and robotics, this Note argues that in ap-
                                                                                 
 306. The evidence presented in the case was minimal. The plaintiff did not 
submit expert reports or have expert testimony. As a result, it is difficult to 
opine how much, if any, additional information would have been received if In-
tuitive were required to submit additional evidence surrounding secondary 
cause, and how that would relate to facts surrounding causation. See Mracek, 
363 F. App’x at 927; Mracek, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (illustrating the evidence 
provided by the plaintiff at trial was minimal). 
  
2019] A BROKEN THEORY 1093 
 
plying the malfunction theory of products liability to surgical ro-
botics, state courts should infer a product defect from the occur-
rence of a malfunction in the absence of abnormal use and raise 
a rebuttable presumption that there were no reasonable second-
ary causes of the malfunction. Founded on historic developments 
in products liability law, the proposed theory aims to reduce the 
burden placed on those that are foreseeably expected to suffer as 
a result of a defective product, the patient, by shifting the burden 
to those that are most able to prevent defective robots from 
reaching the market, the surgical robot manufacturer. While 
some may contend that such a proposal will have drastic practi-
cal implications, due to the limited number of surgical robotics 
cases, preexisting federal regulations, and the advent of value-
based purchasing and risk-based agreements in the healthcare 
industry. In reality, the proposed doctrine would result in more 
responsible manufacturers and the adoption of safer surgical ro-
bots. Ultimately, the proposed solution aims to bring some clar-
ity to an area of the law that has remained in flux for the past 
several decades, with the hope that someday a deserving patient 
will receive their just day in court. 
 
 
 
